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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the affirmative defense of assumption of risk in California
sport injury litigation was plaintiff-focused; the defense asked whether a plaintiff
"knowingly and voluntarily [chose] to encounter the specific risk of harm" posed by
the defendant's conduct.' However, in 1992, the California Supreme Court adopted
a unique "duty" approach for primary assumption of risk cases involving sports. 2
The court ruled that a plaintiff s subjective knowledge and awareness of risks were
irrelevant.3 Instead, the court noted that the focus of the inquiry should be whether
"in light of the nature of the sporting activity in which defendant and plaintiff were
engaged, defendant's conduct breached a legal duty of care to plaintiff."4 Under the
new duty approach, although there is no duty to protect a plaintiff from risks
inherent in the sport itself,' participants, coaches, and instructors will be liable for
intentionally injuring plaintiff or engaging in conduct that is "so reckless as to be
totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport."6 In addition, the
court noted that defendants also "have a duty to use due care not to increase the
risks [to a plaintiff] . . . over and above those inherent in the sport. In the two
decades that have passed since the court adopted its duty approach to primary
assumption of risk, the California cases which address whether coaches or sport
participants have engaged in reckless conduct have become confusing. Courts lack
a uniform approach and continue to apply different standards for recklessness.
This article will address several key problems with both the approach and
standard used for recklessness in California primary assumption of risk sports injury
cases. First, the article will argue the standard itself is unclear. It provides no
guidance to the court or the trier of fact when they are faced with the task of
determining whether a coach's or co-participant's conduct is "so reckless" as to be
"totally outside" the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport. The court's
1Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 304 (1992); see also Vierra v. Fifth Ave. Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266,
271 (1963).
2See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315.
3 Id.
4 Id.
' Id.
Id. at 320; see also Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1011 (2003) (holding that a
coach or instructor is reckless when he or she engages in conduct "totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in teaching or coaching the sport" (citation omitted)).
Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 316.
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language also seems to imply that there are varying degrees of recklessness.
Second, the article will discuss how courts are confused by the relationship
between the concepts of recklessness and inherent risk. The concept of inherent risk
is critical to application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine.9 Inherent risk
defines duty,'0 and a defendant has no duty to protect plaintiff from risks inherent in
the sport." However, because recklessness requires conduct "totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport,"' 2 does a finding that plaintiff was
injured by a risk inherent in the sport preclude a finding of recklessness? I When a
court rules that a risk is not inherent, is the court also saying the risk is "totally
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport"? What is the
relationship between inherent risk and conduct "totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport"? The approach used by courts when they determine
whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk ultimately affects the courts'
approach to recklessness. Unfortunately, California courts do not have a uniform
approach to inherent risk. This adds another layer of confusion to the determination
of whether a defendant's conduct was reckless.
Third, California's courts have noted the potential for confusion regarding
the relationship, if any, between recklessness and the defendant's duty of due care
not to increase the risk.14 Are these duties essentially the same when defendant is a
coach or co-participant? If not, may courts and plaintiff s attorneys use the duty of
due care not to increase the risk as a vehicle to bypass the intentional/reckless
8 Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1018-19 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (noting that the court's recklessness standard is
inconsistent with other definitions of recklessness in the institutional context); see also Freeman v. Hale,
30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1394 n.3 (1994) ("The phrase 'so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the
ordinary activity involved in the sport' suggests both that there are varying degrees of recklessness, and
that whether an activity is one which is ordinarily involved in a particular sport depends, at least in part, on
the degree of recklessness with which a person engages in that activity.").
See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-16 (holding that the defendant's duty to a co-participant depends on the
risks inherent to the sport).
1o Staten v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635 (1996).
1 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-16.
12 Id. at 320.
13 See Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430,440 (1996) (holding plaintiff's suit is
barred and further inquiry into increased risk is precluded when plaintiff's injury was an inherent risk of
the sport); see also Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 38 Cal. 4th 148, 166 (2006) (noting that a pitcher
would have no liability for throwing a baseball at the batter's head because such conduct is an integral part
of the game).
14 Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553 (2000) (stating that the two tests, increasing the risks above
those inherent in the sport and the intentional/reckless standard for injuries to co-participants, can be "a bit
confusing" when read together).
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standard and instead apply a negligence standard to co-participants and coaches in
sport injury cases? 5 In other words, are coaches or co-participants liable when they
negligently increase the risk, or only when they recklessly increase the risk? Must
the increased risk rise to the level of recklessness? Even if one assumes coaches
and co-participants are only liable if they increase the risk to the level of
recklessness, how will one determine when that threshold has been reached?
Finally, if recklessness is distinct from the duty not to increase the risk, how do
courts know when to apply the duty not to increase the risk instead of the duty not to
recklessly injure plaintiff? California primary assumption of risk case law provides
little guidance.
Fourth, some courts of appeal, perhaps frustrated by the lack of a clear
standard for recklessness, have traveled beyond the California Supreme Court's
definition and have used different standards to determine whether a defendant's
conduct was reckless. Some courts have used the Restatement (Second) of Torts to
define recklessness in primary assumption of risk sports injury cases.16 In addition,
some courts have used a policy test for recklessness based on the policy to avoid
chilling vigorous participation and to avoid altering the nature of a sport.1
This article takes the position that California primary assumption of risk
jurisprudence lacks a uniform, clear, and manageable approach to recklessness. Part
11 of this article will examine California's current duty-based approach to primary
assumption of risk, as set out in Knight v. Jewett1 and its progeny. Part III will
examine California's lack of a clear approach to recklessness in primary assumption
1 See, e.g., Hemady v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566,578-79 (2006) (applying a
negligence standard to a coach and finding that the "Knight/Kahn limited duty ofcare" did not apply); see
also Huff v. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732, 746(2006) (noting that, although the trial court must consider
on remand whether defendant increased the risk, the case against defendant co-participant was based on
ordinary negligence and the facts did not show recklessness). But see Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th
544, 554 (2000) (noting that co-participants are liable for recklessness and recognizing that any increase in
the risk must rise to the level of recklessness); see also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th
577, 597 n. 10 (2004) (explaining that any increase in the risk by a coach or co-participant must rise to the
level of recklessness).
1 See, e.g., Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1200 (2006); see also Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal.
App. 4th 461, 470 (2007) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965) for the definition of
recklessness); see also Huff 138 Cal. App. 4th at 746 n.8 (concluding defendant's conduct was not
reckless, using the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965).).
1 Towns, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 470 (finding that conduct is reckless, i.e. totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in a sport, "when the prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous
participation in the sport nor otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport."); see also Cohen v.
Five Brooks Stable, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1476, 1509 (2008) (using a policy test to define recklessness).
".Knight, 3 Cal. 4th 296 (1992).
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of risk cases. Part IV will suggest a possible remedy. Part V contains the
conclusion.
II. CALIFORNIA'S CURRENT APPROACH TO ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN
SPORT INJURY CASES
California's duty approach to assumption of risk in sport injury cases began
with Knight v. Jewett in 1992.'9 In Knight, the court recognized that a sport
participant owes no duty to protect a co-participant from an inherent risk in the
sport.20 Instead, the duty of a co-participant is to refrain from intentionally injuring
plaintiff or engaging in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport. 2' Later, in Kahn v. East Side Union High
School District, the court applied this same limited duty of care to coaches and
*22 23instructors. Recently, in Shin v. Ahn, the court revisited its recklessness standard
in a suit between golfers; the court embraced a broad "totality of circumstances"
inquiry when determining whether defendant's conduct was totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.24
A. Knight v. Jewett Creates a New Duty Approach for
Assumption of Risk
In Knight v. Jewett, the California Supreme Court answered the question of
whether the doctrine of assumption of the risk survived the adoption of comparative
fault in California.2 5 Knight involved an injury that occurred when two players in a
touch football game collided while playing during halftime at a Super Bowl party.26
Each team was comprised of men and women.27 No rules were discussed prior to
the game. 28 According to Plaintiff Kendra Knight, she told defendant Michael
Jewett not to play so rough, or else she would stop playing.2 9 On the next play,
19 Id.
20 
Id. at 315.
21 Id. at 320.
22 Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal.4th 990, 1011 (2003).
2 Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482 (2007).
24 Id. at 499-500; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 996-97 (noting that the "totality of the circumstances
precludes the grant of defendants' motion for summaryjudgment" and ruling that defendants' recklessness
"cannot properly be resolved on summary judgment.").
25 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 303.
26 Id. at 300.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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defendant knocked plaintiff to the ground and stepped on her right hand.30 Plaintiff
and defendant disagreed as to how the injury occurred. According to defendant, he
collided with plaintiff when he jumped up trying to intercept a pass. ' Plaintiff
contended the pass was already caught by another player when defendant ran into
her from behind, knocked her down, and stepped on her hand.32 As a result of the
collision, plaintiffs little finger was injured and ultimately was amputated.
Plaintiff filed suit for negligence and assault and battery. 3 4 Defendant's
answer asserted the defense of reasonable implied assumption of the risk.35 At the
time of the suit, the California Courts of Appeal were split on the issue of whether
the doctrine of assumption of the risk survived the adoption of comparative fault in
California. 3 6 Plaintiff argued that the doctrine had been eliminated by the adoption
of comparative fault.3 7 In the alternative, plaintiff argued that even if reasonable
implied assumption of risk survived the adoption of comparative fault, she only
could have reasonably anticipated receiving a minor bump or bruise because of the
nature of the "mock" game, the casual setting, and the fact that men and women
were joint participants on the teams." The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 9 The California Court of Appeal affirmed.4 0
B. The California Supreme Court's Plurality Opinion
The California Supreme Court upheld the entry of summary judgment in
defendant's favor. 4 1 The court noted that there are two main categories of
30 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 300.
31 Id.
32 id.
" Id. at 301.
34 Id.
Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 301.
Id. at 303.
n7 Id. at 301 (plaintiff also argued that the different accounts of the collision created a dispute of material
fact).
n Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 303.
Id. at 321. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk wrote that he agreed with the result
and that liability should not be imposed on a defendant unless his conduct falls outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). However, Justice Mosk
would have eliminated any reference to assumption of risk to avoid confusion. Id. He believed it was
time to eliminate the doctrine. Id. Justices Panelli and Baxter, also concurring and dissenting, agreed that
summary judgment was properly entered in defendant's favor; however, they would have used the
traditional consent-based approach to assumption of the risk which focused on plaintiffs subjective
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assumption of risk: first, "primary assumption of risk" which "embodies a legal
conclusion that there is 'no duty' on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff
from a particular risk."; second, secondary assumption of the risk "in which the
defendant does owe a duty of care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly
encounters a risk of injury caused by the defendant's breach of that duty .... 42
The court ruled that secondary assumption of risk did not survive the adoption of
comparative fault; however, primary assumption of the risk did survive the adoption
of comparative fault.4 3 The court noted that the distinction between primary and
secondary assumption of risk is not based on whether the plaintiff reasonably or
unreasonably encountered a risk, but rather on whether the defendant owes the
plaintiff a duty of care." The court held that the doctrine of primary assumption of
risk will shield a sport participant from liability, unless the participant "intentionally
injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport."4 5 The court noted:
[Tihe question whether the defendant owed a legal duty to protect the
plaintiff from a particular risk of harm does not turn on the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of plaintiffs conduct, but rather on the nature of the activity or
sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and
the plaintiff to that activity or sport.46
The existence and scope of the defendant's duty of care is a legal question
for the court, not a question for the jury.4 7
The court recognized that the nature of the sport involved is "highly
relevant" in defining the duty of care owed by a defendant. 48 Regarding the nature
knowledge and awareness of the risk. Id. at 322-23 (Panelli, J. & Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). In
her dissent, Justice Kennard disagreed both with the new duty approach to assumption of risk adopted by
the plurality and also disagreed with their decision to affirm summary judgment for the defendant. She
noted that the new "duty approach" to assumption of risk transformed assumption of risk from a defense
into a part of plaintiffs prima facie case. Id. at 324 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In addition, she expressed
concem that the new approach would create difficulty for lower courts because the determination of
whether a risk is inherent is a fact intensive finding. Id. at 337-38 (Kennard, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Kennard, defendant's motion for summary judgment should have been denied because defendant
did not "present uncontroverted evidence that his own rough level of play was 'inherent' in or normal to
the particular game [of touch football] being played." Id. at 338 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 308.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 309.
4 Id. at 320.
46 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 309.
41 Id. at 313.
4 Id. at 315.
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of the sport, the court noted that "defendants generally have no legal duty to
eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself . . . .
However, defendants do have a "duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a
participant over and above those inherent in the sport." s0 The court noted that
'[i]n some situations...' the careless conduct of others is treated as an 'inherent
risk' of a sport."' The court stated: "in the heat of an active sporting event like
baseball or football, a participant's normal energetic conduct often includes
accidentally careless behavior.,,52 In addition, a defendant's conduct that violates
the rules of a sport will not necessarily result in legal liability:5 3
[E]ven when a participant's conduct violates a rule of the game and
may subject the violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the
sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might
well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring
participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to,
but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule.5 4
Under Knight's new approach to primary assumption of the risk in sport
injury cases, plaintiff's knowledge and awareness of the risk plays no role. The
court noted: "the duty approach provides an answer which does not depend on the
particular plaintiff's subjective knowledge or appreciation of the potential risk."
The application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine depends upon whether
the defendant owed a duty to protect plaintiff against a particular risk of harm, or to
avoid certain conduct, rather than being based on plaintiffs subjective knowledge
or appreciation of the risk." Thus, in Knight, the court's focus was not on whether
plaintiff subjectively knew of, and voluntarily chose to encounter, the risks of
defendant's conduct; the court noted that application of primary assumption of the
risk was dependent upon "whether, in light of the nature of the sporting activity in
which defendant and plaintiff were engaged, defendant's conduct breached a legal
duty of care to plaintiff."
The court concluded the defendant's conduct was not reckless.58 Although
4 Id.
soid. at 316.
s Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 316.
12 Id. at 318.
s3 Id. at 318-19.
4 Id.
s Id. at 316.
16 Id. at 316-17.
5 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315.
" Id. at 320.
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plaintiffs version of how the collision occurred was different from defendant's
version, the court ruled that regardless of which account was accurate, neither
account involved conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport. In sporting and recreational activities, participants
frequently engage in "normal energetic conduct" and such conduct "often includes
accidentally careless behavior."60 The court recognized that the imposition of
liability for such behavior would have a chilling effect on vigorous participation in
the particular sport.61 If such a "chilling effect" would not arise from imposition
of liability, then primary assumption of risk need not apply. 62
C. Recklessness Addressed in Knight's Progeny
After Knight, two decisions from the California Supreme Court played a
central role in the development of California's approach to recklessness in primary
assumption of risk sport injury cases: Kahn v. East Side Union High School
District and Shin v. Ahn.
1. Kahn v. East Side Union High School District
In Kahn, the Plaintiff was a fourteen-year-old member of her high school's
junior varsity swim team. When she was attempting a practice dive in a shallow
racing pool during a competition, she broke her neck.6 6 She filed suit against her
coach and the school district,6 alleging that her coach failed to provide her with
instruction regarding how to dive into a shallow racing pool, lack of supervision,
and breach of a duty of care by forcing her to dive despite her fear and objections;
plaintiff also alleged the coach promised her she would not have to complete a
" Id. at 320-21.
6 Id. at 318.
Si Id.
62 Id. at 318-20; see also Shannon v. Rhodes, 92 Cal. App. 4th 792, 799 (2001) (holding primary
assumption of risk does not apply where imposition of a duty of care on boat driver for a ride around a
lake with passengers would not have a chilling effect on recreational boating).
63 Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990 (2003).
6 Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482 (2007).
6 Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 995.
66 Id.
67 Plaintiffs claims against the istrict were for premises liability and negligent training, supervision, or
control of its coaches; the trial court's grant of summaryjudgment in favor of the District was affirmed by
the court of appeal and was not the subject of further appeal to the California Supreme Court. Id. at 997
n.1.
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racing dive.
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Acknowledging the two duties set out in Knight, the trial court found that primary
assumption of the risk applied and defendants could not be liable "unless they had
elevated the risks inherent in competitive swimming or had behaved recklessly."70
The court of appeal affirmed.7 1 The court of appeal addressed whether defendants
"pushed plaintiff beyond her capabilities" or "increased her risk in some other
way." 72 The court held that even if the coach challenged plaintiff to improve her
skills and broke a promise to plaintiff, he did not increase the risk of harm plaintiff
faced. The court of appeal ignored a declaration from plaintiffs expert which
stated that one of the coaches, Coach McKay, increased the inherent risk in the sport
when he failed to instruct plaintiff how to conduct the racing dive in a shallow
pool. 74 A dissenting justice noted that primary assumption of risk should not be
determined by the court as a matter of law because the issue of whether defendants
increased the risk ofharm inherent in competitive swimming was a material dispute
of fact.7 ' The dissenting justice ruled: "One increases the risk of harm over that
inherent in a sport when an authority figure, such as a coach, pushes a young person
to engage in a dangerous maneuver without first providing basic instruction." The
dissent noted that there was a triable issue whether Coach McKay placed plaintiff in
a situation "that presented an unreasonable risk of injury."7 7
The California Supreme Court reversed and remanded.7 ' The court
examined the relationship between plaintiff, defendants, and the sport, and
concluded that the same standard used for co-participant liability first announced in
Knight also should apply to coaches and instructors.79 Accordingly, the court held:
In order to support a cause of action in cases in which it is alleged
that a sports instructor has required a student to perform beyond the
student's capacity or without providing adequate instruction, it
* Id. at 995.
6 Id. at 1000.
7 Id.
71 Id. at 1001.
n Id.
7 Id.
7 Id.
7 Id. at 1002.
76 Id.
77 Id.
7 Id. at 1018.
7 Id. at 1011.
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must be alleged and proved that the instructor acted with intent to
cause a student's injury or that the instructor acted recklessly in the
sense that the instructor's conduct was "totally outside the range of
ordinary activity [citation omitted] involved in teaching or
coaching the sport."80
The court then concluded there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether
Coach McKay acted recklessly based on:
the lack of training in the shallow-water dive disclosed by
plaintiffs evidence, especially in the face of the sequenced training
recommended in the Red Cross manual submitted by plaintiff; the
coach's awareness of plaintiffs deep-seated fear of such diving; his
conduct in lulling her into a false sense of security through a
promise that she would not be required to dive, thereby eliminating
any motivation on her part to learn to dive safely; his last-minute
breach of that promise under the pressure of a competitive meet;
and his threat to remove her from the team or at least the meet if
she refused to dive.
Based on the above, the court concluded it was possible to find the coach's
"conduct was reckless in that it was totally outside the range of ordinary activity
involved in teaching or coaching the sport of competitive swimming." 8 2 Although
the court noted that expert testimony should not be relied upon to establish the legal
question of duty, the court ruled that expert testimony may be received "for
purposes of weighing whether the inherent risks of the activity were increased by
the defendant's conduct."83
2. Shin v. Ahn
The California Supreme Court recently revisited recklessness in a primary
assumption of risk golf injury case, Shin v. Ahn. 8 4 In Shin, a golfer sued for
negligence when defendant "pulled" his tee shot, causing his golf ball to strike
plaintiff in the temple.8 ' At the time plaintiff was struck by the ball, plaintiff was
approximately twenty-five to thirty-five feet from defendant and at a forty to forty-
so Id.
81 Id. at 1012.
82 Id. at 1013, 1015 (also holding that there was a factual issue regarding whether the coach's acts or
omissions were causally related to plaintiffs injury).
8 Id. at 1017; see also Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482, 491 (2007).
14 Shin, 42 Cal. 4th 482.
" Id. at 487.
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five degree angle from the intended path of the ball. The parties disagreed as to
whether defendant knew plaintiffs location at the time he teed off." The rules of
golf require that a player look to ascertain whether any one is in a position to be
struck before he or she hits the ball."' The trial court initially granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment based on primary assumption of risk; however, the
trial court later reversed itself and concluded triable issues of fact existed.89 The
court of appeal affirmed, applying ordinary negligence; the court of appeal held
primary assumption of risk did not apply because defendant failed to ascertain
plaintiffs location before teeing off.90 The California Supreme Court reversed.9'
The court held that primary assumption of risk did apply to regulate the golfer's
duty; however, the court held there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether the
defendant's conduct was "so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in golf."92 When the Shin court addressed whether defendant's
conduct was "so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary conduct
involved in the sport," the court noted that the trier of fact must engage in a broad
"totality of circumstances" inquiry.9 3
8 Id.
87 Id.
Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 488.
o Id.
91 Id.
9 Id.
The court ruled:
In determining whether defendant acted recklessly, the trier of fact will have to
consider both the nature of the game and the totality of circumstances surrounding
the shot. In making a golf shot the player focuses on the ball, unlike other sports in
which a player's focus is divided between the ball and other players. That is not to
say that a golfer may ignore other players before making a shot. Ordinarily, a golfer
should not make a shot without checking to see whether others are reasonably likely
to be struck. Once having addressed the ball, a golfer is not required to break his or
her concentration by checking the field again. Nor must a golferconduct a headcount
of the other players in the group before making a shot. Many factors will bear on
whether a golfer's conduct was reasonable, negligent, or reckless. Relevant
circumstances may include the golfer's skill level; whether topographical
undulations, trees, or other impediments obscure his view; what steps he took to
determine whether anyone was within range; and the distance and angle between a
plaintiff and defendant.
Id. at 499-500 (citation omitted); see also Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 996
(2003) (concluding that the case could not properly be resolved on summary judgment when considering
the "totality of the circumstances" and noting that the declarations raised a disputed issue of material fact).
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Ill. THE LACK OF A CLEAR APPROACH TO RECKLESSNESS
California's primary assumption of risk doctrine lacks a clear approach to
recklessness for several reasons: First, the trier of fact is given no guidance
regarding how to determine when conduct is totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in a sport. Second, the relationship between recklessness, the
concept of inherent risk, and the duty to not increase the risk, is unclear. Third,
lower courts continue to use different standards for recklessness, in addition to the
Knight standard.
A. Confusion Created by the Knight Standard
Courts continue to be confused by the definition of recklessness first
adopted by the California Supreme Court in Knight v. Jewett. When is conduct "so
reckless" as to be "totally outside" the range of ordinary activity involved in the
sport? For example, is there a difference between "reckless as to be outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport" and "so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport"? If so, what is the
difference and how is it measured? Did the court intend to imply there are varying
levels of recklessness? In addition, under Knight's recklessness definition, how are
courts to distinguish between reckless conduct and negligent conduct that falls
outside the range of ordinary activity involved a sport? Lower courts remain
perplexed when forced to apply Knight's definition of recklessness.94 The courts
need direction regarding where to draw the line between negligence and
recklessness. The current body of California assumption of risk case law provides
no clear answer.
Traditionally, California equated reckless conduct with conduct involving a
"deliberate disregard" of the "high degree of probability that an injury will occur."95
9 See, e.g., Freeman v. Halc, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1393 n.3 (1994) ("The phrase 'so reckless as to be
totally outside the range ofthe ordinary activity involved in the sport' suggests both that there are varying
degrees of recklessness, and that whether an activity is one which is ordinarily involved in a particular
sport depends, at least in part, on the degree ofrecklessness with which a person engages in that activity.
While negligence is frequently divided into ordinary negligence and gross negligence, recklessness is
generally not similarly segregated. Moreover, we do not understand how the state of mind of the person
engaging in an activity can affect whether that activity is or is not one which is ordinarily involved in a
particular sport.").
9s See City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4th 747,754 n.4 (2007); see also Delaney v. Baker,
20 Cal. 4th 23, 31-32 (1999); Donnelly v. S. Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 869 (1941); Morgan v. S. Pac.
Transp. Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1011 (1974) (listing California cases which define recklessness as
conduct making it highly probable that harm would follow).
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Recklessness differed from negligence because reckless conduct did not involve
simple inadvertence, un-skillfulness, or incompetence.9 6  Instead, recklessness
involved a "conscious choice" to engage in conduct with "knowledge of the serious
danger to others involved in it."97 Indeed, Prosser equates recklessness with
"willful" or "wanton" misconduct." The traditional approach, which focused on
defendant's knowledge of serious danger to others and the high probability that
injury would occur, provided at least some direction for courts. The Knight
approach, however, focuses on conduct "totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport" rather than on conduct that poses a serious danger to
others or has a high probability of injury. 99 Presumably, the court chose not to
focus on the high probability of injury to define recklessness because "[i]n the
sports setting ... conditions or conduct that otherwise be viewed as dangerous often
are an integral part of the sport itself."oo However, did the court intend to imply
that any conduct outside the range of ordinary activity is reckless? It would appear
not. The court noted that even sport rule violations and occasional careless conduct
are inherent risks of sports and will not lead to liability; the goal is to encourage
Delaney, 20 Cal. 4th at 31-32 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1965)).
17Id.; see also Santa Barbara, 41 Cal. 4th at 754 n.4.
Prosser, The Law of Torts § 34, at 185 (4th ed. 1971); see also Santa Barbara, 41 Cal. 4th at 754 n.4;
Morgan, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 1011.
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318 (1992). As one Justice noted several years later, the court's
standard for recklessness is difficult to understand and is very different from a traditional recklessness
standard:
I therefore agree with the majority that an instructor should be liable for a student's
injury in the course of learning a sport only if the instructor's conduct is found to
have been "'totally outside the range ofthe ordinary activity' [cite omitted] involved
in teaching or coaching the spon."[cite omitted] Although the majority also adopts
Knight's label of such conduct as "reckless", I do not understand our standard, at
least in the instructional context, to be equivalent to recklessness as it is sometimes
understood, i.e., as the "wilful [sic] or wanton misconduct" shown when an actor has
"'intentionally done an act ofan unreasonable character in disregard ofa risk known
to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to
make it highly probable that harm would follow.' Rather, I believe a coach or
instructor departs from the range of ordinary instructional activities, increasing the
risks of injury beyond those inherent in teaching a sport, and is therefore subject to
liability, when his or her conduct constitutes a gross or extreme departure from the
instructional norms. In this, I agree with counsel for amicus curiae California Ski
Industry Association, who, at oral argument, suggested the proper standard would
look to an "extreme departure from standards of ordinary care.
Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1018-19 (2003) (Werdegar, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
10 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1004.
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vigorous participation.'o' Participants should not be held liable for "normal
energetic conduct."' 0 2 Thus, the focus becomes the court's use of the adjective
"totally." When is conduct "totally" outside the range of ordinary activity involved
in the sport, rather than "slightly" or "barely" outside the range of ordinary activity
involved in the sport? Unfortunately, there is no clear answer.
In Knight, the plaintiff was injured when playing a game of coed touch
football using a peewee football. o' According to Plaintiff Knight, defendant was
playing rough, and approximately five to ten minutes into the game, she asked him
not to play so rough." On the very next play, defendant ran into plaintiff from
behind, knocked her to the ground, and stepped on her hand.'0o The court's only
application of its recklessness standard was a brief assertion that the defendants
conduct was not reckless, with no clear explanation of how the court reached its
conclusion:
The declarations filed in support of and in opposition to the
summary judgment motion establish that defendant was, at most,
careless or negligent in knocking over plaintiff, stepping on her
hand, and injuring her finger. Although plaintiff maintains that
defendant's rough play as described in her declaration and the
declaration of Andrea Starr properly can be characterized as
"reckless," the conduct alleged in those declarations is not even
closely comparable to the kind of conduct--conduct so reckless as
to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in
the sport--that is a prerequisite to the imposition of legal liability
upon a participant in such a sport. Therefore, we conclude that
defendant's conduct in the course of the touch football game did
not breach any legal duty of care owed to plaintiff. Accordingly,
this case falls within the primary assumption of risk doctrine, and
thus the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant. 0 6
The difficulty of assessing whether conduct is "totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport" becomes even more apparent when the
Knight Court's holding regarding recklessness is compared with that same Court's
holding in Shin v. Ahn.'07
'o' Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 316, 318-19.
102 Id. at 318; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1004.
103 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 300.
104 Id.
'o' Id. at 300-01.
'0 Id. at 320-21.
107 42 Cal. 4th 482 (2007).
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In Shin, discussed above, 0o the court held there was a triable issue of fact
regarding whether the defendant's conduct was "so reckless as to be totally outside
the range of the ordinary activity involved in golf."' 09 When the Shin Court
addressed the standard, the court gave little guidance, if any, regarding where to
draw the line between negligent and reckless conduct. Instead, the court noted that
the trier of fact must engage in a broad "totality of circumstances" inquiry when it
decides whether defendant's conduct was "so reckless as to be totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport":
In determining whether defendant acted recklessly, the trier of fact
will have to consider both the nature of the game and the totality of
circumstances surrounding the shot. In making a golf shot the
player focuses on the ball, unlike other sports in which a player's
focus is divided between the ball and other players. That is not to
say that a golfer may ignore other players before making a shot.
Ordinarily, a golfer should not make a shot without checking to see
whether others are reasonably likely to be struck. Once having
addressed the ball, a golfer is not required to break his or her
concentration by checking the field again. Nor must a golfer
conduct a headcount of the other players in the group before
making a shot. Many factors will bear on whether a golfer's
conduct was reasonable, negligent, or reckless. Relevant
circumstances may include the golfer's skill level; whether
topographical undulations, trees, or other impediments obscure his
view; what steps he took to determine whether anyone was within
range; and the distance and angle between a plaintiff and
defendant.o"0
Rather than provide a clear roadmap for lower courts to use when
determining whether conduct is reckless, the Shin Court broadens the inquiry
considerably into a "totality of the circumstances" test that seems to go far beyond
conduct ordinarily involved in the sport of golf. For example, the court includes the
golfer's skill level. How does the golfer's skill level relate to conduct that is totally
beyond the range of activity involved in the sport of golf? A golfer's skill level is
arguably subjective. How is it to be measured? More importantly, how does it
relate to the court's definition of recklessness? If the golfer is relatively unskilled is
he or she more, or less, likely to be reckless? Is particular conduct, such as failing
1os See discussion supra Part II.C.2..
' Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 488.
"o Id. at 499-500 (footnote omitted); see also Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990,996
(2003) (concluding that "the totality of the circumstances precludes the grant ofdefendants' motion for
summary judgment.").
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to see if the path is clear before taking a tee shot, more acceptable from a novice
golfer? Stated another way, is the failure to see if the path is clear considered
conduct not "totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport" of
golf if defendant was a novice golfer, but reckless if the golfer was a professional or
experienced golfer? It is interesting that the court seemed entirely unconcerned
about the skill level of the parties or the nature of the football game in Knight. The
football game in Knight was an informal touch football game using a peewee
football; the game included both men and women."' As the Dissenting Justice in
Knight noted, the parties understood the game would be "mellow" and
"noncompetitive" without any "forceful pushing, hard hitting or hard shoving."ll 2
Why did the Knight Court fail to look at the totality of the circumstances and fail to
consider whether, in such an informal, coed game, the defendant's rough play which
knocked plaintiff to the ground was totally outside the range of ordinary activity
involved in the sport of touch football? Arguably, Knight also could have held the
question of recklessness was one for the jury.
Even when a defendant violates a rule of the sport, as the defendant did in
Shin, such a violation is not always helpful to a court or trier of fact for purposes of
determining defendant's recklessness. Although the touch football game in Knight
had no formal rules, such as the rules used in the game of golf, the court has held
that even the violation of the rules of a sport, which often occur as a part of normal
energetic conduct in a sport, usually are not sufficient to establish legal liability.
1 
14
Rule violations and carelessness are often inherent risks of a sport and will not lead
to liability. '" Therefore, such violations cannot be determinative when the trier of
... Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 300.
112 Id. at 334 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
113 It also is interesting to note that the parties in both Knight and Shin disputed precisely how plaintiff's
injury occurred. The parties in Knight disputed how the collision occurred. Kahn, 3 Cal. 4th at 300.
Similarly, Shin involved a dispute of fact regarding where plaintiff was standing at the time of injury.
Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 487.
114 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318-19; see also Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 489. However, it is interesting to note that
such a rule violation arguably could become more important when the rule concerns ascertaining whether
the path is clear before hitting a golf ball. The court has stated rule violations should not lead to legal
liability because the court wants to encourage vigorous play. Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318-19. Requiring a
golfer to check whether his or her path is clear likely will not discourage vigorous play in the sport of golf.
"t The California Supreme Court has ruled:
[E]ven when a participant's conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the
violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal
liability for such conduct might well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by
deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to, but on
the permissible side of, a prescribed rule.
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fact decides whether defendant's conduct was totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport.
The Shin Court also noted that "conduct that might be found reckless when
engaged in on a crowded course might be found otherwise if the course is largely
deserted."' 6 Although Knight decided the defendant was not reckless as a matter of
law, could not a similar statement be made regarding the defendant's conduct at
issue in Knight? For example, is it possible that conduct that might be engaged in
during a regular football game might be found reckless when engaged in during an
informal touch football game? Is it possible that conduct that might be engaged in
during a touch football game involving only men might be found reckless when
engaged in during a touch football game between men and women? Similarly, the
Knight recklessness standard refers to conduct totally outside the range of "ordinary
activity" involved in the sport. What is "ordinary activity"? How is it determined?
Is it a question of frequency? For example, if amateur golfers routinely hit the ball
without checking whether the path is clear, can the trier of fact determine the
conduct is not "totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport"?
Using another example, what if a snowboarder chose not to tether his snowboard to
his boot or ankle using a retention strap, and the snowboarder lost control of the
board and the board struck a skier?' 7 Is the snowboarder's failure to use a retention
strap "totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport"? How
would the trier of fact answer this question? Would it depend on whether
snowboarders "ordinarily" use retention straps?"' Case law provides no clear
guidance regarding where to draw the line when determining whether a defendant's
conduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.'
Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318-19; see also Kahn, 31 Cal.4th at 1004-05; Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 51 Cal.
App. 4th 1358, 1367 (1996); Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1204 (2006).
" Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 499-500 n.11.
117 These facts were before the court in Campbell v. Derylo. 75 Cal. App. 4th 823 (1999).
"' Id. at 830 (holding it is for the jury to determine whether defendant snowboarder's failure to use a
retention strap increased the risks of skiing and proximately caused plaintiffs injuries from defendant's
runaway snowboard).
It is interesting to note that the Campbell Court quotes the test from Freeman v. Hale, which states:
[C]onduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport (and
thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not inherent to the sport) if the
prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor
otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport.
Campbell, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 829 (quoting Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1394 (1994)). While
this might appear to be a policy-based test for recklessness, both courts in fact use it as the test for inherent
risk, not recklessness. The question of inherent risk, unlike the question of recklessness, is a question of
94
Thus, rather than helping to clarify the standard, the Shin Court's totality of
circumstances inquiry and laundry list of recklessness considerations miss the point:
Under the Knight standard for recklessness, how is the trier of fact to distinguish
reckless conduct from conduct that is merely negligent or careless? Stated another
way, how is the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant's conduct was
"totally" outside the range of ordinary activity involved in golf, rather than "barely"
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in golf? What measure or test should
the trier of fact use? Where will the trier of fact turn for guidance when it decides
whether the defendant's conduct was "totally outside the range of ordinary activity
involved in the sport"? California case law provides no clear answers.
B. Confusion Created by the Relationship Between "Inherent Risk",
the "Duty Not to Increase the Risk", and the Duty to Avoid
Conduct "So Reckless as to be Totally Outside the Range of
Ordinary Activity Involved in the Sport"
Much of the confusionl2 0 regarding the recklessness standard in California
assumption of risk cases appears to stem from the relationship between three key
principles set out by the California Supreme Court in Knight and repeated by
Knight's progeny. First, there is no duty to protect plaintiff from risks inherent in
the sport.121 Second, a defendant owes a duty not to intentionally injure plaintiff or
to engage in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of activity
involved in the sport.122 Third, a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of due care not to
increase the risks inherent in the sport.' 2 3 How do these statements relate to one
another, if at all? Do these statements comprise a multi-part test? After the court
determines whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk in the sport, where does
the inquiry go next? Does the inquiry end and is the plaintiffs suit barred by
law for the court and is intertwined with the question of duty. Thus, the trier of fact cannot use the policy
question regarding chilling participation and altering the nature of the sport to determine recklessness,
because the application of the policy to the facts is a question of law for the court. Inherent risk defines
duty, and duty is a question of law for the court. Staten v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635
(1996). But see Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461,470-71 (2007) (using policy-based inherent
risk test as rule for recklessness).
120 Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553 (2000) (noting that the different tests in Knight are
confusing).
121 Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315-16 (1992).
122 Id. at 320.
3
Id. at 315-16.
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primary assumption of risk?12 4 Or, does the court next ask whether defendant
increased the risk or whether defendant was reckless? 125 The California courts lack
a uniform approach when answering these questions. As explained below, the
courts lack a uniform approach to inherent risk. In addition, the courts are confused
regarding whether recklessness remains the appropriate standard of care for coaches
and co-participants in cases where a plaintiff's injury did not result from a sport's
inherent risks. Finally, courts are confused by the relationship between recklessness
and the duty of due care not to increase the risk inherent in the sport.
1. Courts Lack a Uniform Approach to Inherent Risk
The determination of whether a plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in
the sport is crucial to the application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine.126
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the question of whether
defendant owes a duty to protect plaintiff from harm depends on "the nature of the
activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the
defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport."' 2 7 The court's reference to the
"nature of the activity or sport" is actually a reference to inherent risk. "[U]nder
Knight a trial court is to determine the question of duty as a function of the scope
and definition of a given active sport's inherent risks." 28 "In the context of sports,
the question [of duty] turns on whether a given injury is within the inherent risk of
the sport." 2 9 Thus, "'inherent risk' defines duty."' 3 0 Duty is an issue of law to be
124 See Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430, 440 (1996) (ruling that a finding
plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk necessarily precludes the possibility of finding that defendant
increased the risk).
125 This Article will not examine the liability of commercial venue owners/operators and equipment
suppliers in sport injury cases; however, they have been held liable for ordinary negligence. See Kahn v.
E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1004 (2003) (stating that duty will vary depending on the
role played by the defendant; for example, a stadium owner may have a duty to protect a spectator from a
carelessly thrown bat); see also Bjork, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 553 (noting that ordinary negligence and not
assumption of risk applies in cases involving equipment suppliers; and that "supplying the equipment is
something separate and distinct from participation in the sport and the tests for liability are accordingly
different."); Peart v. Ferro, 119 Cal. App. 4th 60, 72 (2004) (stating that the defendant's duties will vary
depending on his or her relationship to the plaintiff, whether he or she was a co-participant, coach, venue
owner, or equipment supplier).
126 See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-16.
... Id. at 309, 314-15; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1004; Cheong v. Antablin, 16 Cal. 4th 1063, 1068
(1997).
12 Staten v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1633 (1996).
129 Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 826 (1999) (quotations omitted); see also Staten, 45 Cal.
App. 4th at 1635.
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decided by the court. '3 As a result, the approach courts use to define inherent risk
is crucial and will determine whether the doctrine of primary assumption of risk
applies in a given case.
Unfortunately, California courts use several distinct approaches, or a
combination of approaches, when deciding whether a plaintiff was injured by a risk
inherent in the sport. First, some courts state that the question of whether a risk is
inherent "is necessarily reached from the common knowledge of judges" who
examine the risks involved in a sport and the nature ofplaintiff's injury.132 Second,
some courts approach the concept of inherent risk from a policy standpoint and hold
that a risk is not inherent if it can be eliminated without altering the nature of the
sport or chilling vigorous competition.3 3 Third, some courts combine the concept
of inherent risk with the defendant's duty not to increase the risk above what is
inherent in the sport,1 34 while other courts hold that the question of whether
defendant increased the risk is a question of breach for the trier of fact. 135 Finally,
some courts use a broad focus when examining the facts to determine inherent risk
and only consider the general type of accident which injured plaintiff, 1 while other
courts use a narrow focus and look not only at the general type of accident, but also
at the specific conduct of the defendant.'3 7
a. The Common Knowledge Approach
Some courts have held that common knowledge, and even common sense,
should form the basis for a finding that a plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk in
130 Staten, 45 Cal. App. 4th at 1635.
"' Id. at 1633-35; see also Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 313 (stating that it is a question for the court rather than a
jury).
132 Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1083 (2011) (quoting Staten, 45 Cal. App.
4th at 1635).
33 Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1394 (1994); see also Campbell, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 829-30;
Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof'1 Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 (1997) (noting that a risk is inherent if
it is an essential or integral part of a sport).
134 Huff v. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732,745 (2006); see also Am. GolfCorp. v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.
App. 4th 30,36-37 (2000); Huffman v. City ofPoway, 84 Cal. App. 4th 975,995 n.23 (2000); Hemady v.
Long Beach Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566, 573 (2006).
1s Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577, 591-92 (2004); see also Solis v. Kirkwood Resort
Co., 94 Cal. App. 4th 354, 365 (2001); Luna v. Vela, 169 Cal. App. 4th 102, 113 (2008) (noting that "the
Court [. . .] held whether the defendant had breached that limited duty of care by engaging in reckless
conduct was a question for the trier of fact . . . .").
136 See Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430, 440 (1996).
137 See Huff 138 Cal. App. 4th at 743 (considering ATV operator's violation of safety regulations).
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a sport. The approach that determines inherent risk based on the common
knowledge of judges was recently used in Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd 39 In
Rosencrans, a motorcycle rider and his wife sued a motocross track operator for
negligence. 140 The plaintiff rider was struck by two separate motorcyclists after he
fell off of his own motorcycle at a motocross track. 141 Although a caution flagger
usually was present at the location where plaintiff fell, the caution flagger instead
was on the far side of the track when plaintiff fell and was injured.142 The tria- court
entered summary judgment for the track operator. 143 On appeal, when the court of
appeal addressed the question of whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk,
the court framed the question as "we must determine whether being crashed into
twice by coparticipants is a risk inherent in the sport of motocross."'44 The court
then used the common knowledge approach to determine whether plaintiff s injury
was an inherent risk of motocross:
[T~he legal question of duty, and specifically the question of
whether a particular risk is an inherent part of a sport, 'is
necessarily reached from the common knowledge of judges . . . .'
Motocross is a sport in which people ride motorcycles and perform
jumps off of ramps, while in a setting filled with dust and other
people on motorcycles. Given the racetrack setting, speed
involved, and jumping maneuvers, it follows that coparticipants
will fall down, and while down, be struck by other riders whose
138 Staten v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635 (1996) (noting that inherent risk is to be
determined from common knowledge ofjudges); see also Luna, 169 Cal. App.4th at I 10 (recognizing that
the risk of tripping over a tic line in volleyball is common knowledge and a matter of common sense);
Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461, 473 (2007) (noting that the risks of skiing are "commonly
understood"); Zipusch v. Los Angeles Workout Inc., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1292 (2007) (recognizing
that common sense indicates negligent maintenance of sport exercise equipment is not an inherent risk).
3 Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1076 (2011); see also Branco v. Kearny
Moto Park, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th 184, 193 (1995) (ruling thatjumps and falls are inherent risks ofbicycle
competitions); DiStefano v. Forester, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1249, 1264 (2001) (recognizing that a collision
between a motorcycle and a dune buggy is an inherent risk of off-roading); Staten, 45 Cal. App. 4th at
1630 (ruling that being cut by another skater's blade is an inherent risk of group skating).
140 Rosencrans, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1077-78. Although Rosencrans was not a suit against a coach or co-
participant, it illustrates the use ofcommon knowledge to establish inherent risk. Plaintiffs' suit was based
on negligence, negligent training and supervision, and loss of consortium. In addition to primary
assumption of risk, the court also considered whether the suit was barred by an express release signed by
plaintiff. Id. at 1079-83.
Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1077-78.
43 Id. at 1076.
44 Id. at 1083.
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views are obscured by the blind corners, blind ramps, dust, and/or
other riders. 145
Thus, the Rosencrans Court used common knowledge to conclude that
riders will occasionally fall and be struck by other riders. The court did not take
policy into account when deciding the question of inherent risk; instead, the court
considered policy to avoid chilling vigorous participation and to avoid altering the
nature of the sport when the court later addressed the track operator's role and its
obligation to provide a reasonably safe course.146
b. The Policy-Based Approach
A different approach, based on policy, was used to determine whether
plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk in Freeman v. Hale.4 7  In Freeman,
plaintiff Deborah Freeman and her husband sued Hale for personal injury and loss
of consortium after Deborah Freeman and Hale collided while skiing. 148 Deborah
Freeman suffered quadriplegia, and plaintiffs alleged the collision was the result of
Hale skiing "negligently, recklessly and carelessly." 4 9 Hale had been drinking and
manifested "symptoms normally associated with drinking alcohol." 50 Applying the
primary assumption of risk doctrine, the trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of Hale and plaintiffs appealed. 151
The court of appeal reversed. 152 When determining whether the risk was
inherent, the court of appeal did not simply focus on the fact that collisions are
common in skiing and the fact that plaintiff and defendant collided while skiing. '
Under such an approach, the court of appeal's conclusion would undoubtedly have
been the same as the trial court's: that the plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk
in the sport.154 Instead, the court cited Knight as support for a policy based test for
inherent risk: The Freeman Court ruled "a risk is inherent if it cannot be eliminated
145 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430,440
(1996) (recognizing that, because collisions are inherent in football, plaintiffs suit based on injuries
received when he collided with another player during practice was barred by primary assumption of risk).
146 Rosencrans, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1084.
147 Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1994).
148 Id. at 1391.
149 Id.
1so Id.
1s1 Id.
s Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1396-97 (stating that although there was no duty to avoid a collision with the plaintiff, the
defendant did have a duty not to increase the risk, which he failed to meet).
154 Id.
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'without altering the nature of the sport.'" 155 Later in the same opinion, the court
restated its policy-based test for inherent risk in a slightly different fashion:
[C]onduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved
in the sport (and thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not
inherent to the sport) if the prohibition of that conduct would
neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor otherwise
fundamentally alter the nature of the sport. 156
The court of appeal ruled that, because drinking alcoholic beverages before
and during skiing could be prohibited without altering the fundamental nature of the
sport or deterring vigorous participation, drinking alcohol is not an activity involved
in the sport of skiing and any increased risks posed by drinking are not inherent in
the sport of skiing. Thus, the court concluded that Hale did not establish the
defense of primary assumption of the risk to bar plaintiffs suit.' Following the
court of appeal in Freeman, other courts have used the same policy-based test for
inherent risk.159
Some courts, although using an approach similar to the policy-based
approach in Freeman, phrase the policy-based test for inherent risk in a different
manner. For example, in Lowe v. California League ofProfessional Baseball, 1o the
antics of a mascot distracted a baseball game spectator at the moment when he was
struck by a foul ball during the game. Plaintiff sued the team and league for
negligence, and the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on primary assumption of risk. 162 The court of appeal reversed1 63
'ss Id. at 1393; see also Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318-20 (1992).
Freeman, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1394; see also Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof I Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th
112, 123 (1997) (noting that when determining inherent risk, the "key inquiry here is whether the risk
which led to plaintiff's injury involved some feature or aspect of the game which is inevitable or
unavoidable in the actual playing of the game").
57 Freeman, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1396; see also Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 17 Cal. App. 4th 322,
329-30 (1993) (holding that falling on the dance floor, when defendants sprinkled Ivory Snow Flakes on
the floor, was not an inherent risk because prohibition of the flakes use would not fundamentally alter
dancing, assuming dancing was a sport); Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 830 (1999)
(recognizing that requiring defendant to use a retention strap while snowboarding would not
fundamentally alter the sport or snowboarding).
15 Freeman, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1396-97.
Hemady v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566, 576 (2007); see also Bush, 17 Cal.
App. 4th at 329-30; see also Campbell, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 830.
Lowe, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112.
161 Id. at 114.
162 Id.
163 Id.
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and applied a broad policy-based test to determine inherent risk, similar to the test
used in Freeman:
[T]he key inquiry here is whether the risk which led to plaintiff's
injury involved some feature or aspect of the game which is
inevitable or unavoidable in the actual playing of the game. In the
first instance, foul balls hit into the spectators' area clearly create a
risk of injury. If such foul balls were to be eliminated, it would be
impossible to play the game. Thus, foul balls represent an inherent
risk to spectators attending baseball games. Under Knight, such
risk is assumed. Can the same thing be said about the antics of the
mascot? We think not.'6
Although the court of appeal in Lowe initially noted that being struck by a
foul ball was an inherent risk of attending a baseball game, the court then asked
whether the specific conduct of the mascot, which according to the plaintiff,
distracted the plaintiff and caused his injury was an inherent risk of the sport. 165
The court ultimately concluded that being distracted by the mascot was not an
inherent risk of attending a baseball game because the conduct of the mascot was
not an integral part of the game as a matter of law.166 The court held primary
assumption of risk did not bar the plaintiff's suit and ruled that it was for thejury to
determine whether the mascot's conduct was negligent.' 6 7
c. The Approach Which Combines Inherent Risk with the
Duty Not to Increase the Risk
Several cases use an approach that combines the question of inherent risk
with the defendants' duty not to increase the inherent risk. 16 Under this approach,
when a court decides the question of duty, the court not only considers whether
plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk, but also decides, as a question of law
related to duty, whether defendant increased the risk inherent in the sport. One case
which illustrates this approach is Huff v. Wilkins.' 6 9
In Huff an off-roader was injured by a fourteen year old driving an all-
64 Id. at 123.
165 Id. at 124.
'6 Id. at 123.
167 Id. at 114.
'66 Huffv. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th732, 745 (2006); see also Am. GolfCorp. v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.
App. 4th 30, 37 (2000); Huffman v. City of Poway, 84 Cal. App. 4th 975, 995 n.23 (2000); Hemady v.
Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566, 573 (2007).
69 Huff, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 745.
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terrain-vehicle (ATV) when the parties collided near the crest of a hill. 7o The
owner's manual for defendant's ATV warned that the vehicle should not be
operated by anyone under the age of sixteen.' 71 In addition, individuals under the
age of eighteen are prohibited from operating ATVs on public land without adult
supervision by California Vehicle Code section 38503 and a Bureau of Land
Management safety rule. 12 Plaintiff sued the minor driver for negligent driving and
sued the minor's father for negligent entrustment. 173 The trial court entered
summary judgment in defendants' favor based on primary assumption of risk. 74
The court of appeal reversed, finding that the minor's violation of the safety
regulations was not an inherent risk of the sport of off-roading.' 7 5 When the court
of appeal addressed the question of duty based on the inherent risks of the sport of
off-roading, the court noted that the inquiry has two parts and includes the question
of whether defendant increased the risk:
Other courts, including this court, have concluded that because the
primary assumption of the risk doctrine involves issues of duty, the
trial court determines both prongs of the duty analysis. In Huffman
v. City of Poway, we explained that in the first prong, the court
decides the inherent risks of a sport without the aid of experts. In
the second prong, the court may consider expert evidence in
deciding whether a defendant's conduct increased the inherent risks
of the sport. . . . We conclude it is the trial court's province to
determine whether defendants breached their duty not to increase
the inherent risk of a collision, and it should hold a hearing for this
purpose before impaneling a jury.
Thus, Huff uses a two-part approach to duty, which combines inherent risk
with the inquiry regarding whether defendant increased the risk. Although Huff
holds that the court should determine whether defendant increased the risk as a
question of law regarding duty, other courts disagree." For these courts, the
17 Id. at 736.
171 Id.
17' Id. at 735.
1 Id. at 737.
174 Id.
7 Id. at 743. The court of appeal also ruled that defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing
they did not increase the risk and were not the proximate cause of the accident. Id. at 736.
16 Id. at 745 (internal citations omitted).
17 Luna v. Vela, 169 Cal. App. 4th 102, 112-13 (2008); see also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., I18 Cal.
App. 4th 577, 591 92 (2004); Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co., 94 Cal. App. 4th 354, 365 (2001); Lowe v.
Cal. League of Prof I Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 (1997).
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question of whether defendant increased the risks inherent in the sport is separate
from the inherent risk inquiry and separate from duty; instead, these courts
recognize that the question of whether defendant increased the risk is a question
regarding breach and is for the trier of fact, not the court.'7 8
d. The General vs. Specific Approach
Courts using the approaches discussed above also vary regarding the level
of specificity to which they consider the defendant's conduct when deciding
whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk. For example, some courts seem to
focus on the conduct, in general, that resulted in plaintiff's injury, such as a collision
in football, 179 skiing,'" or motocross. 18 Other courts examine the defendant's
conduct in detail, for example drinking alcohol and colliding with another skier, 18 2
racing and colliding with another skier,183 failing to use a retention strap to prevent a
runaway snowboard from striking another skier in the back,18 4 or, as seen in Lowe
above, focusing not only on the fact plaintiff was struck by a foul ball during a
baseball game, but also on the fact that a mascot was distracting plaintiff at the time
he was struck by the foul ball.' Whether the court's focus on defendant's conduct
is general or specific will have a profound impact on the court's ultimate
determination of whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk.
One example of the general focus approach can be seen in Fortier v. Los
Rios Community College District. In Fortier, a student sued his college and the
college district after he collided with another player during football practice. 87
Plaintiff asserted he was entitled to recover based on negligent supervision and
negligent instruction.'8 8 Plaintiff also contended that defendants increased the risk
of harm inherent in the sport of football by encouraging aggressive drills,
misleading participants into believing the drills would be noncontact, and by failing
to inform offensive players that defensive players would attempt to intercept
178 Luna, 169 Cal. App. 4th at 112-13; see also Vine, 118 Cal. App. 4th at 591-92; Solis, 94 Cal. App. 4th
at 365; Lowe, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 123.
79 Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430,440 (1996).
.so Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461, 467 (2007).
i' Rosencrans v. Dover Images, Ltd., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1072, 1089 (2011).
182 Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1390 (1994).
183 Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1200-01 (2006).
18 Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 830 (1999).
B5 Lowe v. Cal. League ofProf l. Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112, 122 (1997).
86 Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430 (1996).
in Id. at 432.
'" Id. at 433.
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passes. 89 When deciding whether plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in the
sport, the trial court focused on the general type of accident that injured plaintiff.
The trial court noted that plaintiff was injured in a collision and ruled that plaintiff's
collision injury was an inherent risk of the sport of football.'90 The trial court ruled
that the plaintiff s suit was barred and that there was no need to address whether the
defendant's conduct increased the risk.191 The court of appeal affirmed and held
that "[t]he decisive issue here is whether the collision m which plaintiff was injured
is an inherent risk in the sport in which he was participating. Since it clearly is, the
possibility that plaintiffs injury resulted from an increase by defendants in the
inherent risk is necessarily excluded." 9 2
Thus, in Fortier, both the trial court and the court of appeal chose to ignore
the specific conduct of defendant which plaintiff asserted increased the risk of harm
beyond what was inherent in the sport. Both courts easily could have framed the
question of inherent risk to incorporate defendant's conduct of encouraging
aggressive drills and misleading participants into believing the drills would be
noncontact; however, they chose not to do so.
The court in Staten v. Superior Court 194 also used a general focus on the
type of accident when deciding whether plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in
the sport. In Staten, Plaintiff Marie Bafus was cut on the arm when she collided
with another skater, Mary Staten, during a group skating session.' 9 5 At the time of
the collision, Mary Staten, the skater who struck Bafus, was practicing an outward
backward spiral which required her to skate backward with her leg in the air,
" Id. at 436.
19 Id. at 440.
191 Id. at 432.
92 Id. at 440.
193 An interesting comparison can be made between Fortier and Kahn regarding this point. Kahn noted
that serious injury, including the severe spinal cord injury which plaintiff'suffered, was an inherent risk of
shallow racing dives. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1011-12 (2003). However,
unlike the court in Fortier, which barred plaintiff's suit after finding plaintiff's injury was an inherent risk,
the Kahn Court did not end the inquiry and bar plaintiff's suit. Instead, the court continued the inquiry to
examine whether the coach's conduct increased the risk of harm and was reckless. Id. at 1018; sec also
Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1392 (1994) (noting that although collisions are inherent in
skiing, thejury must determine whether defendant's consumption of alcohol increased the risk); Lowe v.
Cal. League of Prof'l. Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 (1997) (noting that, although being struck by a
foul ball is an inherent risk ofattending a baseball game, the jury then must determine whether the antics
of the mascot increased the risk).
1 Staten v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1628 (1996).
"s Id. at 1630.
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parallel to the ice.1 96 At the time of the collision, Plaintiff Bafus was stationary and
was practicing a three-hundred-sixty degree spin.'9 Bafus sued Staten, her parents,
her coach, the skating club, and the ice rink.' 98 The trial court denied defendants'
motion for summary judgment, ruling that it was a triable issue of material fact
whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk of figure skating.'99 The court of
appeal reversed and issued a writ of mandate ordering the lower court to enter
summary judgment in defendants' favor. 2 0 0 Rather than framing the inherent risk
question narrowly by focusing on defendant Staten's specific conduct of extending
her skate parallel to the ice at the time of the collision, the court instead framed the
inquiry broadly, focusing on the general type of accident and noting that collisions
and subsequent injuries are inherent in skating:
We thus agree with petitioners that collisions with other skaters in
group skating sessions, and the injuries that may result therefrom,
are inherent risks of the sport of figure skating.[footnote omitted]
Bafus insists, however, that being cut by the blade of a backward-
moving skater is not an inherent risk of the sport. Bafus contends
that Staten had a duty to check that her route was clear before she
began her backward spiral . ... [F]igure skating is more analogous
to snow skiing, where the fluidity of action and the presence of
others renders the risk of collision inherent.201
The Staten court ignored the specifics of the collision for purposes of
determining whether plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in the sport. Instead,
the court ruled the risk of injury was inherent and plaintiffs suit was barred by
202primary assumption of risk.
Thus, courts use several different approaches when determining whether
plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in a sport. As illustrated above, because
"9 Id. at 1631.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
2 Id. at 1636-37.
201 Id. at 1634.
202 Id. The court of appeals also noted that it was improper for the trial court to consider expert testimony
regarding inherent risk because inherent risk defines duty, which is a question of law for the court. Id. at
1635-37; Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1017 (2003) ("We do not rely upon
expert opinion testimony to establish the legal question ofduty, but 'we perceive no reason to preclude a
trial court from receiving expert testimony on the customary practices in an arena of esoteric activity for
purposes of weighing whether the inherent risks of the activity were increased by the defendant's
conduct."').
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inherent risk defines duty,203 the fact that courts lack a uniform approach when
determining inherent risk is not without consequence. Framing the facts broadly or
narrowly, using the "common knowledge" approach instead of the policy-based
approach, or combining inherent risk with the duty to not increase the risk affects
the application of primary assumption of risk and can change the outcome in a
particular case. In fact, depending upon the court's approach to inherent risk, the
court's answer to the question of whether a particular risk was inherent will often
204
determine whether the question of defendant's recklessness can even be raised.
2. Is Recklessness the Appropriate Standard for a Coach or a Co-participant
when the Plaintiff Was Not Injured by an Inherent Risk?
California's lower courts' also disagree regarding the practical effect of a
determination that plaintiff was not injured by an inherent risk of the sport. For
some courts, if the plaintiff was not injured by a risk inherent in the sport, the case is
no longer governed by the reckless/intentional limited duty under Knight and a duty
of ordinary care may be applied;20 5 under such circumstances, the case would
proceed under a negligence theory using comparative fault principles.206 Other
courts have held that in cases where coaches or co-participants are defendants, the
case must proceed using the limited duty for coaches and co-participants set forth in
Knight and its progeny. In other words, for the latter courts, even if plaintiff was
injured by a risk that was not inherent, coaches and co-participants are only liable if
they intentionally injure plaintiff or engage in conduct so reckless as to be totally
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.207
203 Staen, 45 Cal. App. 4th at 1635; see also Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 826 (1999).
204 See, e.g., Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th 430,440 (1996) (ruling that plaintiffs
suit is barred by primary assumption of risk and further inquiry into increased risk is improper after the
court determines plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk).
20s See Hemady v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566, 583 (2006); see also Huff v.
Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732, 744-45 (2006).
2 Hemady, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 574 n.6; see also Huff 138 Cal. App. 4th at 744-46 (noting that on
remand the case will proceed based on ordinary negligence and the trial court must determine whether
defendant increased the inherent risks).
207 See Campbell, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 828 -30; see also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th
577, 598 n. 10 (2004) (noting that any increase in risk by a coach or co-participant must rise to the level of
intentional or reckless conduct to be actionable); Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553-54 (2000)
(noting that co-participants arc liable for recklessness and recognizing that any increase in the risk must
rise to the level of recklessness); Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011-12.
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a. Some Courts Apply an Ordinary Reasonable Care Standard
One example of a case where a court applied a standard of ordinary care to
a coach is Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School District.20 8 In Hemady, a twelve
year old girl sued her coach and the school district for injuries she received when
she was struck in the face with a golf club during physical education class.20 9 On
the sixth day of golf instruction, the coach had students practice a full swing hitting
wiffle balls. 210 He instructed the students on safety precautions and warned them of
the danger of being hit by a golf club. 211 He also instructed students to stand at least
212ten feet behind any student who was swinging a golf club. Although whistle
commands were used to signal when students were to hit balls, retrieve balls, and
rotate positions, plaintiff asserted that the class was unorganized and uncontrolled at
213times. Plaintiff was struck in the mouth with the golf club when she approached
the student in front of her at a time when the student appeared to be finished
214
hitting.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants based on
primary assumption of risk. 15 Plaintiff appealed.2 16 The court of appeal noted that
the issue before it was whether to apply the reckless/intentional standard from
Knight or a regular duty of due care.21 According to the court, the question of
whether Knight's limited duty applied was "determined by an objective analysis of
the nature of the sport or activity and the parties' relationship to that activity."
2 18
208 Hemady, 143 Cal. App. 4th 566; see also Yancey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App.4th558, 565 (1994)
(holding that the careless conduct of throwing a discuss without first checking whether the target area was
clear was not an inherent risk of the sport and applying an ordinary negligence standard when the discus
struck a co-participant). It is interesting to note that Yancey compared discus throwing to golf, noting the
sports similarities and implying that the negligence standard would be appropriate if a golfer failed to
check his or her intended target area before hitting the golf ball. See id. at 566. However, years later, the
California Supreme Court held that recklessness, not negligence, was the appropriate standard when a
golfer failed to check the target area, striking another golfer with the golf ball. See Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal.
4th 482, 497 (2007).
209 Hemady, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 569.
21
0 Id. at 571.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 572.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 573.
218 Id. at 576.
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The court of appeals used a policy test for inherent risk and concluded that it was
not an inherent risk in the game of golf to be hit in the head by a golf club swung by
another golfer; the court noted this was especially true in a physical education
class.219 The court ruled, after examining the nature of the sport and the parties
relationship, that the application of a duty of due care would neither alter the nature
of the sport nor chill a coach's role to challenge students and encourage vigorous
participation. 2 2 0 The court stated: "Because the policy considerations underlying the
Knight and Kahn cases do not apply here, we conclude that the prudent person
standard of care governs defendants' potential liability." 2 2 1
Under the Hemady court's approach, the policy behind the assumption of
risk doctrine plays a key role in determining whether the limited duty of Knight
applies to a given situation. If the policy does not apply, the case is outside the
doctrine of primary assumption of risk and ordinary comparative fault applies. A
limited duty using the intentional/reckless standard from Knight is unnecessary.22 2
However, contrary to Hemady, other courts apply the limited duty under Knight in
cases where coaches and co-participants are defendants, even in cases where the
court uses a similar policy test to determine plaintiff was not injured by an inherent
risk.
b. Some Courts Apply the Reckless/Intentional Standard
Contrary to the approach used in Hemady, many courts recognize that
coaches and co-participants cannot be liable for mere negligence in sports injury
cases. For example, in Campbell v. Derylo,223 plaintiff was struck in the back by a
runaway snowboard when she stopped at the bottom of the hill to put her skis on.224
Defendant Derylo stopped approximately one hundred yards from the bottom of the
hill and removed his snowboard; however, he lost control of the snowboard after he
219 Id.
22' Id. at 576-79. The court also noted that plaintiff did not assert she was challenged to perform beyond
her capacity, nor that she was told to perform a particular swing without adequate instruction or
supervision. Id. at 578. Although the court did not state the significance of these facts, the court most
likely included them to distinguish the case from Kahn. See Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011 (2003) (noting that
the limited duty of care applies in cases where asports instructor requires a student to perform beyond the
student's capacity or without providing adequate instruction).
2 Henady, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 579; see also Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482, 493 (2007) (discussing
Henadv and implicitly approving the Henadv Court's use of a conventional duty analysis).
222 See Heinady, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 578-79; see also Yancey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 4th 558,
565 (1994).
223 Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823 (1999).
22 Id. at 825.
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removed his feet from the bindings.225 Although county ordinance and resort rules
required snowboarders to use a retention strap to tether their snowboards to their leg
or boot, defendant did not use a retention strap.226 The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendant based on primary assumption of risk. 227The
trial court ruled that it was an inherent risk of skiing to be struck by a runaway
snowboard and the court found there was no evidence the defendant was reckless. 2 2 8
Plaintiff appealed and argued that defendant's use of a snowboard without a
retention strap was conduct outside the inherent nature of the sport.2 29 The court of
appeal reversed.23 0
The court of appeal noted that "[a] runaway snowboard resulting from
ordinary skier carelessness would seem to fit within the realm of those risks inherent
to the sport." 23 1 However, the court then applied the policy-based inherent risk test
used in Freeman to determine whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk in
the sport:
[C]onduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved
in the sport (and thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not
inherent to the sport) if the prohibition of that conduct would
neither deter vigorous participation in the sport nor otherwise
fundamentally alter the nature of the sport. 2 3 2
The court ultimately determined that the plaintiff was not injured by an
inherent risk, because the use of a retention strap would neither chill participation
nor alter the nature of the sport; the court found "[t]he absence of a retention strap
could therefore constitute conduct not inherent to the sport which increased the risk
of injury."233 The court ruled that primary assumption of risk did not bar plaintiff's
suit.234 However, the court held that the case must go to the jury to determine
whether defendant's failure to use a retention strap increased the risk of harm to
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 826.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 830-31.
231 Id. at 827.
232 Id. at 829 (quoting Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1394 (1994)). It is interesting to note that
this test also incorporates Knight's definition ofrecklessness. As a result, this is yet another source of
confusion.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 830.
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plaintiff.2 35 Although the court based its holding on a possible breach of the
defendant's duty not to increase the risk of harm, the court noted that the
defendant's liability cannot be based on mere negligence; the court recognized that
any increase in the risk would have to rise to the level of recklessness:
At the hearing on the motion, plaintiffs counsel listed four separate
acts or omissions by defendant which he contended went beyond
"ordinary careless conduct" and increased the inherent risk to
Jennifer: (1) failure to wear a retention strap; (2) taking the board
off on a steep slope without consideration for downhill skiers; (3)
failure to move to the edge of the slope before removing his
snowboard; and (4) failure to leave one foot in his snowboard and
walk down the slope. This appeal focuses solely on the absence of
a retention strap. We agree with plaintiffs implicit concession that
each of the other instances of misfeasance mentioned by counsel
constitutes mere ordinary negligence which is not actionable under
236the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.
Thus, the Campbell court reached a conclusion different from the one the
court reached in Hemady and noted that negligence liability was inappropriate, even
after the court recognized that use of a retention strap would not chill vigorous
participation or alter the nature of the sport, and even after the court found primary
assumption of risk did not bar plaintiff's suit.
The court in Lackner v. North reached a conclusion similar to the Campbell
Court's, when the court considered the duty that should apply after plaintiff skier
was struck and injured by a snowboarder.237 When addressing plaintiffs suit
against the snowboarder, the court determined plaintiff was not injured by an
inherent risk, based on the specific nature of the defendant's collision with plaintiff
and stated that "[i]nadvertent collisions with co-participants who carelessly cross
paths are an inherent risk of many sports. . . . In North's view, this was a garden-
variety collision, the type inherent in the sport. We disagree." 2 3 8 The court then
ruled that it would be for the trier of fact to determine whether North's conduct was
235 Id. The court also held the jury must determine proximate cause. Id.
2 Id. at 829 n.2; see also Mastro v. Petrick, 93 Cal. App. 4th 83, 90 n.3 (2001) ("The Campbell court
implicitly recognized that, whether or not engaged in the same sport, both parties were in a designated ski
area and that one owed no duty to the other to avoid mere negligent or careless conduct."); Vine v. Bear
Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577, 597 n. 10 (2004) (noting that participants and instructors "are not
held to have increased the inherent risks ofa sport unless they intentionally injure another or engage in
reckless conduct outside the range of the sports ordinary activities").
237 Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1193 (2006).
238 Id. at 1199.
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reckless:
While racing down an advanced run is part of the thrill of
snowboarding, intentionally speeding into a flat area at the base of
an advanced run where people have stopped to rest, when one is
unfamiliar with the area, without looking where one is going is not
an integral and unavoidable part of the sport. North's conduct is
analogous to a freeway driver who exits the freeway without
slowing down or looking for other cars that are also exiting. As a
result, he crashes into one that has stopped and is waiting to turn
onto a connecting street. Lackner has therefore raised a triable
issue of material fact as to whether North was reckless.
2 39
Thus, it appears the Lackner Court used a fact-specific inquiry for inherent
risk, based on the policy behind Knight to avoid altering the nature of a sport. The
court noted that racing in an area where people have stopped to rest is not an
integral or unavoidable part of the sport of snowboarding. Thus, defendant's
conduct was not an inherent risk of the sport. Nevertheless, unlike the court in
Hemady which applied a standard duty of due care to an instructor when plaintiff
was not injured by an inherent risk and when the Knight policy was not implicated,
both Campbell and Lackner recognize that negligence liability for co-participants
remained inappropriate.2 4 0
Why do some courts apply a negligence standard to coaches and co-
participants when plaintiff is not injured by an inherent risk, while other courts
continue to apply the recklessness standard? The California Supreme Court
recognized that the primary "object to be served by the doctrine of primary
assumption of risk in the sports setting is to avoid recognizing a duty of care when
to do so would tend to alter the nature of an active sport or chill vigorous
participation in the activity." 24 1 Hemady, Campbell, and Lackner all recognized that
the policy would not be thwarted by recognizing a duty; however, they did not all
apply the same standard. The question became: "What duty should be recognized?"
239 Id. at 1201.
240 Campbell, 75 Cal. App, 4th at 829 n.2; see also Lackner, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1197-98. In fact, one court
noted that Campbell should have expressly applied the recklessness standard to the facts even after
rejecting the application of primary assumption of risk. Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553 n.4
(2000) (noting that the Campbell court was confused because it used the "duty not to increase the risk" to
reject the application of primary assumption of risk, but did not thereafter expressly consider whether
defendant was reckless); see also Lackner, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1200 (finding that collision between skier
and snowboarder was not a "garden-variety" collision inherent in the sport, and then applying a
recklessness standard).
241 Kahn v. E. Side Union Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1011 (2003).
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Should the court apply the limited duty of a coach or co-participant to avoid
intentional/reckless conduct or should the court apply a duty of reasonable care? As
Hemady recognized, "[w]hether the Knight/Kahn limited duty of care applies in a
particular case is determined by an objective analysis of the nature of the sport or
activity and the parties' relationship to that activity."24 2. However, courts differ in
the manner they approach this "objective analysis." Are both the nature of the
activity and the relationship of the parties equally important, or is one more
important than the other for purposes of determining whether a limited duty applies?
Stated yet another way, does the limited duty from Knight/Kahn apply only to
inherent risks, or is it meant to apply to a specific category of defendant regardless
of whether the risk is inherent?
Arguably, some courts, such as the Second District Court of Appeal in
Hemady, do not view Knight/Kahn as creating a limited duty of care for particular
categories of defendants in sport injury cases.243 If the Hemady Court believed that
Knight/Kahn created a limited duty of care based on the category of defendant in
sport injury cases, the court arguably would have applied the intentional/reckless
standard to the seventh grade physical education instructor, even after recognizing
plaintiff was not injured by an inherent risk. That appears to be what the Third
District Court of Appeal did in both Campbell and Lackner. Why did the court, in
both Campbell and Lackner, not apply a duty of reasonable care, as did the Hemady
Court? Why did both Campbell and Lackner endorse recklessness as the proper
standard, even after noting that Knight's policy would not be thwarted by
prohibiting defendants' conduct? One possible reason is that other courts, including
the Third District Court of Appeal in Campbell and Lackner, view Knight/Kahn as
creating a limited duty of care that applies to specific categories of defendants in
sport injury cases. In fact, Knight recognized that sport injury cases frequently
involve "diverse categories of defendants" and that "the applicable duty or standard
of care frequently varies with the role of the defendant." 24 4 Indeed, the California
242 Hemady v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566, 576 (2006); see also Yanccy v.
Superior Court, 28 Cal. App. 4th 558, 563-64 (1994).
243 See Bushnell v. Japanese-Am. Religious & Cultural Ctr., 43 Cal. App. 4th 525, 530 (1996) (ruling
"[g]cncral rules of liability attach when the defendant's conduct is not an inherent risk of the activity").
2 Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318 (1992); see also Edmund Ursin & John N. Carter, Clarifying duty:
California's No-Duty-For-Sports Regime, 45 San Diego L. Rev. 383,430 (2008) (noting that Knight was
"determining the standard by which the conduct of a category ofdefendants would bejudged"). Professor
Ursin also notes:
The court has established a clear analytic and policy framework to determine whether
this rule [intentional/reckless limited duty] protects a particular category of
defendants.... The court has also provided a framework fordetermining whether the
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Supreme Court has noted that co-participants, coaches, and instructors have a
limited duty to avoid intentionally or recklessly injuring plaintiff;24 5 however,
24624commercial venue owners and operators and equipment suppliers2 47 are held to a
standard of reasonable care.
If the Knight/Kahn limited duty does apply based on category of the
defendant, then, arguably, Hemady and similar cases are wrongly decided. If the
limited duty of care in sports injury cases is based on the category of defendant,
then negligence liability for coaches and co-participants is arguably inappropriate,
regardless of whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk of the sport. If,
however, the California Supreme Court intended to create a limited duty of care in
sport injury cases only when the Knight policy would be thwarted, and only when
plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk, then negligence liability could be viewed
as appropriate in sport injury cases against coaches and co-participants. 2 4 8 The
Court has noted that both the concept of inherent risk and the category of the
defendant are important when determining the type of duty owed to a plaintiff. 24 9
The court has repeatedly held that the question of whether defendant owes a duty to
protect plaintiff from harm depends on "the nature of the activity or sport in which
the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to
that activity or sport." 250 Thus, both the inherent risks of a sport and the role or
relationship of the parties appear to be important considerations. However,
confusion remains.
The California Supreme Court has implicitly approved of lower court cases
where a negligence standard was used against a coach or co-participant. In Shin v.
Ahn, the court did not criticize the Hemady decision. Instead, it implicitly agreed
with that court's use of a conventional duty approach in a sport injury lawsuit
protection of the intentional injury/recklessness rule extends to categories of
defendants other than participants, coaches, and sports instructors. These other
categories include owners of sports facilities and manufacturers of sports equipment.
Id. at 437-38.
245 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 320; see also Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482, 486, 490-91 (2007), Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th
at 995-96.
246 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-17; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1004.
247 See Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318.
248 Unfortunately, this question becomes even more complicated when one considers the courts do not use
a uniform approach when deciding whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk. See discussion supra
Part IllB. 1.
249 Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 499.
250 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 309, 313, 317; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1004-06; Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 489,495,
498.
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against an instructor:
The court in Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School District
considered the question of inherent risk in a different context....
Noting that the primary assumption of the risk doctrine bars
liability for those injuries arising from the particular risks that are
inherent in a sport, the Court of Appeal concluded that being hit on
the head by a club is not an inherent risk in golf. Thus a
conventional duty analysis was called for.251
Thus, it remains unclear when, if ever, a standard of reasonable care should
be applied to coaches and co-participants in sport injury cases. Is the recklessness
limited duty of care driven by policy and inherent risk? Is it driven by category of
defendant? Is it driven by both? As illustrated by the cases discussed above,
California courts remain divided. Even when the Knight policy would not be
thwarted by imposing a duty of care, courts cannot agree on what standard of care is
appropriate.
3. Confusion Regarding the Relationship Between Recklessness
and the Duty Not to Increase the Risk
Courts also appear confused by the relationship between recklessness and
the duty not to increase the risk. The California Supreme Court imposed not only a
duty for coaches and co-participants to avoid intentional and reckless conduct, but
also a duty of due care not to increase the risk above that inherent in the sport.252
The nature and scope of the duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport
remains unclear in primary assumption of risk case law.253 When the California
Supreme Court first announced the duty of due care not to increase the risk of harm,
it used an example in which a commercial sports venue owner/operator supplied
faulty equipment:
Although defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or
protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself, it is well
211 Shin, 42 Cal. 4th at 493 (citing Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-16, and Hemady, 143 Cal. App. 4th at 567). In
addition to the Shin Court's implicit approval of Hemady, other language in Shin could be viewed as
supporting the application ofan ordinary negligence standard to coaches and co-participants. Shin stated
that "[i]n the sports context, the plaintiff is deemed to have assumed those risks inherent in the sport in
which plaintiffchooses to participate. A defendant participating in the same sporting activity owes no duty
to a coparticipating plaintiffto avoid ordinary negligence as to those risks." Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
Thus, there is no duty to avoid negligence as to inherent risks, but if the plaintiff is injured by a risk which
is not inherent, negligence liability arguably is appropriate.
2 Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315-16, 320.
2 See, e.g., Ursin & Carter, supra note 244, at 387.
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established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care
not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those
inherent in the sport. Thus, although a ski resort has no duty to
remove moguls from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use
due care to maintain its towropes in a safe, working condition so as
not to expose skiers to an increased risk of harm. The cases
establish that the latter type of risk, posed by a ski resort's
negligence, clearly is not a risk (inherent in the sport) that is
assumed by a participant.254
The duty not to increase the risk also has been held to apply to coaches and
co-participants.25 5 What is this duty and how, if at all, does it relate to a co
participant and coach's duty to avoid reckless conduct? For example, in a sports
injury case, when is a court to use the duty not to increase the risk as opposed to the
duty not to intentionally or recklessly injure plaintiff? As applied to coaches and
co-participants, are these two, distinct duties or is the duty not to increase the risk
simply another way of stating that coaches and co-participants must avoid reckless
conduct? In other words, when the duty not to increase the risk is applied to
coaches and co-participants, will any increase in the risk result in a breach of duty
or must the increase in the risk involve conduct "so reckless as to be totally outside
the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport"? Califomia court opinions yield
no definitive answers.
Two decades after Knight, courts remain confused regarding whether to
apply the "duty of due care not to increase the risk" or whether to apply the
intentional/reckless standard when a coach or co-participant is defendant in a sports
injury case. As one court noted:
We concede that the two tests [the increase the risk test and the
intentional/reckless test] thus articulated a few pages apart in
Knight are a bit confusing. [footnote omitted] But we believe that
the correct test is the second one, i.e., that set forth in the portion of
the opinion dealing specifically with the liability of coparticipants
in sports. As applied here, that test means that respondent can only
be liable to appellant for injuries caused the latter by any
254 Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 315-16.
255 Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1396-97 (1994) (applying the duty ofcare not to increase the
risk of a skiing collision to a co-participant skier who consumed alcohol before and while skiing); see also
Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 828-29 (1999) (deciding whether defendant's use of a
snowboard without a retention strap could be found to have increased the risk of injury to a co-participant
of getting hit by a runaway snowboard); Huff v. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732,740-41 (2006) (applying
the duty of care not to increase the risk of a collision when a fourteen-year-old ATV operator violated the
age restrictions).
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intentional or reckless actions undertaken in his or her capacity as
a coparticipant.256
If any increase in the risk is sufficient for a coach's or co-participant's
liability, is the duty to not increase the risk a vehicle plaintiff may use to side-step
the intentional/reckless standard of Knight? After all, arguably not every increase in
the risk ;s reckless. Not every increase in the risk is totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport. In fact, the duty not to increase the risk has
been the basis for liability in negligence cases against commercial venue owners2s7
and equipment suppliers,2 58 where recklessness was not the appropriate standard of
care. Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that the courts, including the California
Supreme Court, refer to the duty not to increase the risk as a "duty of due care,"
259even in cases where co-participants or coaches are defendants. In addition,
numerous cases have used language which implies that any increase in the risk is
sufficient for liability in cases against coaches and co-participants. 26 0 For example,
in Bushnell v. Japanese-American Religious and Cultural Center,261 although the
court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in defendant instructor's favor and
applied a recklessness standard, language in the court's opinion implied that ajudo
instructor would be liable for his student's broken leg if the instructor took any
action to increase the risk:
General rules of liability attach when the defendant's conduct is
not an inherent risk of the activity or when the defendant's conduct
increased the inherent risks in the activity. . . . [D]efendants
generally have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a
256 Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553 (2000).
257 Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof'l Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 (1997) (discussing the issue offact
whether a mascot's routine that distracted a spectator increased the inherent risk of getting hit by a foul
ball).
2 Wattenbarger v. Cincinnati Reds, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 4th 746, 755 (1994)(holding that defendant owed a
duty not to supply faulty equipment that would increase the risks inherent in the game of baseball).
259 
Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 316; see also Kahn v. E. Side Union Sch. Dist., 31 Cal.4th 990, 1006 (2003);
Parsons v. Crown City Disposal Co., 15 Cal. 4th 456, 482 (1997). It is interesting to note that later cases
drop the reference to "due care" and speak only of a duty to not increase the risk. See, e.g., Shin v. Ahn,
42 Cal.4th 482, 486 (2007); see also Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 38 Cal. 4th 148, 162 (2006).
m Bushnell v. Japanese-Am. Religious & Cultural Ctr., 43 Cal. App. 4th 525, 530-31 (1996); see Tan v.
Goddard, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1528, 1533, I535-36 (1993); see also Eriksson v. Nunnink, 191 Cal. App. 4th
826, 842 (2011); West v. Sundown Little League of Stockton, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 4th 351, 360 (2002);
Lupash v. City ofSeal Beach, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1428, 1440 (1999); Lilley v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.,
68 Cal. App. 4th 939, 944 (1998); Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified Sch. Dist., 64 Cal. App. 4th 1112, 1119
(1998); Allan v. Snow Summit Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1369 (1996).
26i Bushnell v. Japanese-Am. Religious and Cultural Ctr., 43 Cal. App. 4th 525 (1996).
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262
participant over and above those inherent in the sport ....
The Bushnell Court's opinion also implicitly recognized that the risk-
increasing conduct it was referring to was not necessarily reckless: "Absent
evidence of recklessness, or other risk increasing conduct, liability should not be
imposed simply because an instructor asked the student to take action beyond what,
with hindsight, is found to have been the student's abilities."26 3
Many subsequent cases have incorporated the Bushnell language regarding
"recklessness, or other risk-increasing conduct" involved in the sport. 2 64 What does
the court mean when it says "or other risk-increasing conduct"? The language
implies that showing evidence of recklessness is only one way to establish liability
of a coach or instructor, and that another way to establish liability is to show
evidence of any risk-increasing conduct whatsoever. If the court's reference to
"other risk-increasing conduct" is simply stating that, once the risk is increased, the
plaintiff was not injured by a risk inherent in the sport, then the reference to "other
risk-increasing conduct" seems to make sense. For these courts, the reference is
merely another way of stating that an increased risk moves the case from primary
assumption of risk to one of comparative fault.265 In fact, as discussed earlier, many
courts do view the defendant's duty not to increase the risk as a part of the court's
initial determination of whether plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk.2 66
However, if that was the court's reason for including the phrase "or other risk-
increasing conduct"- to merely note that increased risks are not inherent - then the
language was unnecessary and merely adds a new layer of ambiguity.
Unfortunately, the language in question easily can be interpreted as an alternative
basis of liability for coaches and co-participants which bypasses Knight's
intentional/reckless standard.26 7 The lower courts of appeal have noted the lack of
268
clarity created by the duty to not increase the risk.
262 Id. at 530.
263 Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
264 Eriksson, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 842; see also West, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 360; Lupash, 75 Cal. App. 4th at
1440; Lilley, 68 Cal. App. 4th at 944; Aaris, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 1119; Allan, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 1369.
265 See, e.g., West, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 361-62.
266 See discussion supra Part Il.B.l.e.
267 See, e.g., Huff v. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732, 744-46 (2006) (recognizing that the lawsuit,
involving an ATV collision between co-participants, could proceed on a negligence theory on remand if
the trial court determines defendant increased the inherent risks). However, in Huff the court considers
the question of whether defendant increased the risk to be a part of the main duty inquiry which the court
addresses as matter of law. See id.
268 See, e.g., Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553 n.4, 554 n.5 (2000).
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The uncertainty in this area should have ended with the court's opinion in
Kahn v. East Side Union High School District.2 6 9 In Kahn, discussed earlier in this
article, 27 0 the California Supreme Court acknowledged that, in a sports injury case
where the defendant is a coach, the defendant's duty not to increase the risk is
breached when defendant engages in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in teaching or coaching the sport.271 The
California Supreme Court explained that "there are circumstances in which the
relationship between defendant and plaintiff gives rise to a duty on the part of the
defendant to use due care not to increase the risks inherent in the plaintiffs
activity."272 The court then recognized "[tihe general proposition that a sports
instructor or coach owes a duty of due care not to increase the risk of harm inherent
in learning an active sport is consistent with a growing line of court of appeal
opinions that have applied the Knight [citation omitted] analysis to claims against
such defendants." 2 7 3 The court noted that this line of court of appeal opinions holds
"an instructor or coach generally does not increase the risk of harm inherent in
learning the sport simply by urging the student to strive to excel or to reach a new
level of competence." 2 74 The court then concluded that "[a]s a general matter,
although the nature of the sport and the relationship of the parties to it and to each
other remain relevant, a student's inability to meet an instructor's legitimate
challenge is a risk that is inherent in learning a sport." 2 7 5 In other words, an
instructor does not increase the inherent risk simply by legitimately challenging a
student to perform. The court recognized that liability for such conduct "would
have a chilling effect on the enterprise of teaching and learning skills that are
necessary to the sport." 2
7 6
The court examined the relationship between plaintiff, defendants, and the
sport, and concluded that the same standard used for co-participant liability first
announced in Knight also should apply to coaches and instructors.277 Accordingly,
the court held:
In order to support a cause of action in cases in which it is alleged
269 Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990 (2003).
270 See discussion supra Part lI.C. I.
271 Khan, 31 Cal. 4th at 1011, 1013.
272 Id. at 1005 (quoting Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 15 Cal. 4th 456, 482 (1997)).
273 Id. at 1006.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 1006-07.
27 
Id. at 1010.
277 Id. at 1011.
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that a sports instructor has required a student to perform beyond the
student's capacity or without providing adequate instruction, it
must be alleged and proved that the instructor acted with intent to
cause a student's injury or that the instructor acted recklessly in the
sense that the instructor's conduct was 'totally outside the range of
ordinary activity [citation omitted] involved in teaching or
coaching the sport." 2 7 8
Thus, Kahn recognizes that a coach cannot increase the risk by challenging
a student to perform. Legitimate challenges are inherent in learning. A coach will
breach his or her duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport only by
engaging in conduct "totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in
teaching or coaching the sport."279 In other words, Kahn supports the proposition
that any increase in the risk by a coach or co-participant must rise to the level of
recklessness.280 As one court noted: "The duties of proprietors of sporting venues
are distinct from those of co-participants or instructors, who are not held to have
increased the inherent risks of a sport unless they intentionally injure another or
engage in reckless conduct outside the range of the sport's ordinary activities."
2 8 1
Notwithstanding Kahn's recognition that any increase in the risk for an
instructor must rise to the level of recklessness, confusion remains. Three years
282
after Kahn, the court of appeal in Huff v. Wilkins, ruled that negligence was a
proper basis for liability in a sports injury lawsuit between co-participants, if the
trial court determines on remand that defendant increased the risk of harm.2 83 In
Huff discussed earlier in this article for its approach to inherent risk,284 an off-
roader was injured in a collision with an ATV rider.285 The court of appeal noted
the case was one of "ordinary negligence." 2 8 6 The court also noted that the facts
would not support a claim for recklessness and that it was not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to deny the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to add
278 Id.
2791 Id. at 1013.
280 See id.; see also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577,597 n.10 (2004) (notingthat Kahn
requires an instructor's increase in the risk to rise to the level of reckless conduct).
281 Vine, 118 Cal. App .4th at 597 n. 10; see also Kane v. Nat'I Ski Patrol Sys., Inc., 88 Cal. App. 4th 204,
213-14 (2001); Mastro v. Petrick, 93 Cal. App. 4th 83, 91 (2001).
282 Huff v. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732 (2006).
2m' Id. at 744-46.
284 See discussion supra Part IlI.B. I.e.
285 Huff, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 736-37.
286 Id. at 744.
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recklessness as a theory of liability.287 Nevertheless, the court held that it was for
the trial court to decide whether the defendant "increase[d] the inherent risk of a
collision."288 The court ruled that if the defendant increased the risk, the case would
proceed to a jury trial for negligence under a "secondary assumption of the risk
theory." 289
As illustrated by the discussion above, California law regarding the
defendant's duty not to increase the risk of harm remains uncertain, especially as
that duty is applied to coaches and co-participants. The majority of cases recognize
that coaches and co-participants are not liable for negligence and that any increase
in the risk must rise to the level of recklessness for them to be held accountable.29
However, some courts still use the "duty of due care not to increase the risk" to
apply negligence liability to coaches or co-participants.291 Confusion remains even
for those courts which require the risk-increasing conduct to be reckless. As
discussed earlier in this article,292 there is no clear way for a court to determine
when conduct reaches that level.
C. Courts Increase the Confusion by Applying Different
Tests for Recklessness
The California courts' approach to recklessness also is inconsistent because
lower courts use different standards for recklessness. Although Knight defines
2. Id. at 746.
m.. Id. at 745.
2 Id. Arguably, the reason Huffsees a negligence theory as appropriate is because the court uses a unique
approach to determining inherent risk. See discussion supra Part IlI.B. I.e. The court's approach includes
the question of whether defendant increased the risk as a part of the court's initial duty determination.
Huff 138 Cal. App. 4th at 745. Under such an approach, a negligence theory arguably could be
appropriate in Hiffifthe court concluded plaintiffwas not injured by an inherent risk and the case was not
governed by primary assumption of risk. However, the author's point remains valid because the court's
unique approach to inherent risk also is a source of confusion.
290 See Bushnell v. Japanese-Am. Religious & Cultural Ctr., 43 Cal. App. 4th 525, 533-34 (1996)
(explaining that, in the absence of evidence of reckless behavior, liability would not attach to a coach's
negligent behavior); see also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577,598 (2004) (recognizing
that coaches and co-participants do not increase the risk inherent in a sport unless the conduct rises to
reckless or intentional conduct); Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 829 n.2 (1999) (disregarding
three of skier's claims against co-participant because the claims constituted mere ordinary negligence);
Dilger v. Moyles 54 Cal. App. 4th 1452, 1456 (1997) ("We do not believe the failure to yell 'fore' is that
reckless or intentional conduct contemplated by the Knight court. . . . [R]cspondent's failure to warn
appellant of his errant shot, while possibly negligent, did not breach a legal duty to appellant.").
291 See, e.g., Huff 138 Cal. App. 4th 732.
292 See discussion supra Part ill.A.
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recklessness as conduct "totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved
in the sport",29 3 some courts apply the recklessness standard from the Restatement
of Torts.294 In addition, at least one court has used a policy test, based on Knight, to
determine whether defendant's conduct was reckless. 2 9 5
1. Some Courts use the Restatement Standard for Recklessness
A lack of clarity regarding the approach to recklessness in sports injury
cases has been enhanced by the decision of some courts to apply the Restatement
definition of recklessness. Several recent cases from California's Court of Appeal
have used the Restatement approach, which does not contain language regarding
whether defendant's conduct was totally outside the range of ordinary activity
involved in the sport. 2 9 6
For example, in Lackner v. North, 29 a skier filed suit to recover for
personal injuries she sustained when a snowboarder collided with her at Mammoth
Mountain Ski Resort. 2 98 The accident occurred on a very steep run designed for
advanced skiers known as Cornice Bowl. 2 9 9 The bottom of Cornice Bowl flattened
out into a natural gathering area and then led to two other runs.30 0 At the time of the
collision, the Plaintiff was stopped in the flat area of Cornice Bowl, which is not an
official rest area; however, the area was largely deserted and was frequently used
for rest.30 At the time of the collision, Plaintiff, who was "an expert skier who had
been skiing for 31 years," was standing with her back to the slope and was speaking
with her husband.302 The Defendant, eighteen-year-old North, was training for a ski
and snowboard championship hosted by the resort. North was ranked third on his
293 Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 320 (1992).
294 See, e.g., Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1200 (2006); see also Towns v. Davidson, 147
Cal. App. 4th 461, 470 (2007) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1965) for the
definition of recklessness); Huff 138 Cal. App. 4th at 746 n.8 (concluding defendant's conduct was not
reckless, using the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1965)).
295 Towns, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 470.
296 See, e.g., Lackner, 135 Cal. App. 4th at 1200; see also Towns, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 470 (citing the
Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 500 cmt. g (1965) for the definition of recklessness); Huff, 138 Cal. App.
4th at 746 n.8 (concluding defendant's conduct was not reckless, using the Restatement (Second) ofTorts
§ 500 cmt. g (1965)).
297 Lackner, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188.
298 Id. at 1193.
299 Id. at 1194.
30 Id.
30' Id. at 1194-95.
302 Id.
121
VOL. 11:1 VIRGINIA SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL FALL 2011
team and was entered to compete in both the slalom and giant slalom events during
the championship. 30 3 The day of the accident was designated as an official training
day for competitors, although. no announcement regarding the training or
championship was made to other resort guests. 3 0 4 North was traveling at a high rate
of speed down the Cornice Bowl advanced run; Plaintiff contended he appeared to
be racing his teammates. 305 North did not see Plaintiff until he was ten to fifteen
feet away from her. The collision resulted in serious injury to Plaintiff.306
Plaintiff sued North, his coach, several school districts and the resort,
alleging negligence. In addition to negligence, she sued North for battery. 307 The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants based on primary
308 309
assumption of risk. Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred
because North was reckless and the other defendants were negligent in protecting
her; thus, her suit was not barred by primary assumption of risk.3 The court of
appeal affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of all defendants except
North; the court of appeal ruled that there were triable issues of fact regarding
whether North was reckless.
The appellate court initially began its discussion of the case by citing the
definition of recklessness used in Knight: "As stated, North is liable to Lackner if
he intentionally injured her or engaged in reckless conduct totally outside the range
of the ordinary activity in the sport . . . ."312 The court then acknowledged that
inadvertent collisions with co-participants are inherent in many sports.313 However,
the court then sidestepped the Knight rule and applied the Restatement definition of
recklessness to the situation:
In North's view, this was a garden-variety collision, the type
inherent in the sport. We disagree. According to section 500 of the
n Id. atl 194.
3 Id.
305 Id.
3 Id. at 1195.
m Id.
301 Id. In addition to primary assumption of risk, the court noted there were other reasons defendants were
not liable. For example, the court noted that the coach and school districts also were immune from
liability under California Government Code section 831.7. Id.
3 Id. at 1196 n.3 (noting plaintiff appealed from the judgment in favor of all defendants except the
Oroville School District).
3' Id. at 1197.
" Id. atl 199.
312 Id.
3 Id.
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Restatement Second of Torts, one acts with reckless disregard for
the safety of another if the actor "does an act or intentionally fails
to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man
to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent." Comment a to that section describes two types of
reckless conduct. In both types, the actor knows or has reason to
know of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm
to another and deliberately proceeds to act or fail to act. However,
in one type the actor proceeds "in conscious disregard of, or
indifference to, that risk. In the other the actor . .. does not realize
or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a
reasonable man in his position would do so. An objective standard
is applied to him, and he is held to the realization of the aggravated
risk which a reasonable man in his place would have, although he
does not himself have it." 3 14
The court then applied the Restatement approach to the facts of the case,
noting that North should have been vigilant to avoid other skiers, including Lackner,
who were downhill, because North "knew that colliding with another skier or
snowboarder while going at a high rate of speed carries a high degree of risk of
serious physical injury."3 " The court noted there was a triable issue of fact whether
the collision was inadvertent and unavoidable as a result of the risks inherent in
snowboarding, or whether North was racing his teammates in an area where people
had stopped to rest.316 Thus, the court focused on the high degree of risk of serious
physical injury when addressing whether North's conduct was reckless.
In Knight and its progeny, the California Supreme Court could have used
the Restatement to define recklessness but chose not to do so. Presumably, the
court did not want to link recklessness with a standard that uses an unreasonable or
high risk of serious harm, because most sports involve such risks. However,
notwithstanding the risk of serious harm involved in most sports, the Restatement
standard is a workable alternative to the Knight standard for recklessness, as
discussed later in this article.
314 Id. at 1200 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)).
31s Id.
16 Id. at 1201.
317 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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2. Some Courts Use a Policy Test to Define Recklessness
Several recent cases defined recklessness using the policy behind the
primary assumption of risk doctrine: the court's desire to avoid altering the nature of
a sport and to avoid chilling vigorous participation. 3 1 8 One case which used this
approach was Towns v. Davidson.319 In Towns, the plaintiff collided with a ski resort
employee while both were skiing.320 Plaintiff sued the resort employee for
negligence and recklessness and the resort for negligent training and supervision of
its employee. 3 2 1 The trial court granted defendants' motion for summaryjudgment
based on primary assumption of risk and plaintiff appealed, arguing there were
triable issues of fact, including the issue of whether the resort employee was
322reckless. The court of appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment in
defendants' favor. 3 2 3 When addressing the issue of whether the resort employee's
conduct was reckless when he collided with plaintiff, the court used a standard from
Knight that incorporated the policy behind the primary assumption of risk doctrine:
To establish Davidson's conduct was reckless and not shielded by
primary assumption of risk, plaintiff must show the conduct was
"so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary
activity involved in the sport."" "[C]onduct is totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport (and thus any risks
resulting from that conduct are not inherent to the sport) if the
prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous
participation in the sport nor otherwise fundamentally alter the
nature of the sport."'
324
Thus, the Towns court quoted the test from Knight for recklessness, but then
used the policy behind primary assumption of risk as its test for recklessness. The
Towns court continued to apply the policy and found that defendant was not
reckless, as a matter of law:
As is readily apparent, the material facts are not in dispute.
318 Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461,470-71 (2007); see also Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 159
Cal. App. 4th 1476, 1509 (2008).
3 Towns, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461.
no Id. at 465.
n2 Id.
n" Id. at 466. Plaintiff also argued that whether the employee was a co-participant while on duty was a
dispute of material fact.
m Id. at 474.
3 Id. at 470 (quoting Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 320, and Distefano v. Forester, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1249, 1261
(2001)).
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Davidson was skiing quickly and aggressively. He likely turned
without first looking to see where he was going because he was
concentrating on his technique, which included looking down the
fall line. These facts do not establish conduct totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport of skiing. There is
no evidence Davidson consciously and deliberately chose to ski in
a manner that knowingly introduced risks of injury foreign to those
inherent in the sport of skiing. Moreover, were we to conclude
Davidson's conduct was so reckless as to be totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport of skiing, we would
call into question vigorous skiing and fundamentally alter the
nature of the sport. For many, the thrill of the sport is to ski as fast
and as aggressively as reasonably possible. Assigning liability to
Davidson on these facts would eliminate that aspect of the sport.325
Towns cited to the court's opinion in Distefano v. Forester326 as the source
for Towns' policy test for recklessness; however, the Distefano case offers no
support for such use of the Knight policy. In fact, the Distefano court specifically
noted that it refused to rule on the issue of defendant's recklessness because it was
not pleaded and was not before the court. 32 The policy-based test Towns quoted
and used from Distefano was not a test for recklessness; instead it was a test for
inherent risk which was taken from Freeman v. Hale.328 Freeman ruled that
"conduct is totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport (and
thus any risks resulting from that conduct are not inherent to the sport) if the
prohibition of that conduct would neither deter vigorous participation in the sport
nor otherwise fundamentally alter the nature of the sport." 329 However, although
this language incorporates the Knight definition of recklessness, a closer
examination of Freeman reveals that the case did not use this language to define
recklessness. Instead, the Freeman Court was defining the concept of inherent
330 331risk, which is a question of law. Inherent risk defines duty and is not a
question for the trier of fact. 332 Towns' use of the policy from Knight to determine
whether conduct is reckless is problematic. The Supreme Court has recognized that
duty is intertwined with policy and both are matters for the court, not the trier of
325 Id. at 471.
326 Distefano v. Forester, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1249 (2001).
327 Id. at 1264.
328 Id. at 1261 (quoting Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1394, 1396 (1994)).
329 Freeman, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1394; see also Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823, 829 (1999).
330 Freeman, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1394 (using the Knight policy test to define inherent risk).
33 See id. at 1395; see also Staten v. Superior Court,45 Cal. App. 4th 1628, 1635 (1996).
332 Staten, 45 Cal. App. 4th at 1635.
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fact. Recklessness, on the other hand, is typically treated as a fact question for
334the trier of fact. Although on occasion courts may decide recklessness as a
matter of law, 335 many, if not most, recklessness cases are left to the trier of fact.336
If recklessness is determined by applying the Knight policy, and the question of
recklessness if left with the trier of fact, it would ultimately be the jury who decides
whether the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies. As a result, under that
scenario, the jury would also decide whether there is a duty. Such an approach
would be contrary to the express instructions of Knight and its progeny.
Another difficulty with defining recklessness using the policy definition
from Knight is that there are many situations when the test simply would not work.
Using the Knight policy to define recklessness can lead to absurd results. Using the
policy definition to define recklessness will not work because there are many
situations when defendant's conduct can be prohibited without altering the nature of
the sport or chilling vigorous participation, yet the defendant's conduct is not what
one would traditionally think of as reckless, nor is the conduct totally outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport. An example of a situation where
the Towns' recklessness test would arguably lead to absurd results is Lowe v.
California League of Professional Baseball.337  Although Lowe was not a
recklessness case because it was a spectator suit against a venue owner applying an
ordinary due care standard, 3 38 Lowe nevertheless can be used to illustrate that not all
conduct which can be prohibited using the Knight policy test should be labeled
reckless.
In Lowe, plaintiff was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending a
minor league baseball game. Plaintiff sued the baseball league and the baseball
club, known as the Quakes. 3 4 0 At the time of the injury, the Quake's team's mascot,
a dinosaur named Tremor, was in the stands performing his antics; Tremor's tail
repeatedly hit Plaintiff in the back of the head, distracting plaintiff's attention away
33 Shin v. Ahn, 42 Cal. 4th 482, 488 (2007) (stating that "[t]hc existence of a duty is not an immutable
fact of nature, but rather an expression of policy considerations providing legal protection, . . . [which is
why] the existence and scope ofa defendant's duty is a question for the court's resolution."); see also Kahn
v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1004 (2003).
3 See Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at l013.
33 See, e.g., Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1207 (2006).
336 See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 1012-13; see also Shin, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 499; Campbell v. Derylo, 75
Cal. App. 4th 823, 828-29 (1994).
3 Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof'I Baseball, 56 Cal. App. 4th 112 (1997).
31 Id. at 123.
1 Id. at 114.
3o Id.
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from the game.3 4 1 Plaintiff was struck by the foul ball when he looked in Tremor's
direction. 34 The trial court entered summary judgment in defendants' favor based
on primary assumption of risk.343 The court of appeal reversed. 34
Although the Knight policy test was not used as a test for recklessness, the
court of appeal did apply the Knight policy test to decide whether plaintiff was
injured by a risk inherent in the sport of baseball:
[T~he key inquiry here is whether the risk which led to plaintiffs
injury involved some feature or aspect of the game which is
inevitable or unavoidable in the actual playing of the game. In the
first instance, foul balls hit into the spectators' area clearly create a
risk of injury. If such foul balls were to be eliminated, it would be
impossible to play the game. Thus, foul balls represent an inherent
risk to spectators attending baseball games. Under Knight, such
risk is assumed. Can the same thing [it was an inherent risk] be
said about the antics of the mascot? We think not. Actually, the
declaration of Mark Monninger, the person who dressed up as
Tremor, recounted that there were occasional games played when
he was not there. In view of this testimony, as a matter of law, we
hold that the antics of the mascot are not an essential or integral
part of the playing of a baseball game. In short, the game can be
played in the absence of such antics. Moreover, whether such
antics increased the inherent risk to plaintiff is an issue of fact to be
resolved at trial.345
Even though Lowe was not a recklessness case, it is apparent that the antics
of the mascot cavorting in the stands would meet the Towns' policy-based test for
reckless conduct. The mascot's conduct can be prohibited without altering the
nature of the game or chilling vigorous participation. Stated another way, the
mascot's conduct, even the mascot's presence, is not a feature or aspect of the game
which is inevitable or unavoidable. Therefore, under Towns' policy-based approach
to recklessness, the mascot's conduct would meet the test for recklessness.
Similarly, if the plaintiff in Lowe had been distracted by a vendor selling peanuts,
the vendor's conduct also could be viewed as reckless under Towns' policy-based
approach to recklessness because baseball games also can be played without
vendors. A game without vendors would not chill vigorous participation, nor would
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
' Id. at 123.
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it alter the nature of the game. The Towns approach is unworkable because it will
result in all conduct being labeled reckless, if that conduct is not inevitable or
unavoidable in a sport. This example illustrates why using the Knight policy as a
standard for recklessness will not work. Conduct can be prohibited using the Knight
policy, and yet that same conduct might not be "totally outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport." Indeed, most people would agree that it is absurd to
consider a mascot moving about in the stands, or a vendor selling peanuts during a
baseball game, to be reckless. It strains credibility to label all conduct as reckless
merely because that conduct can be prohibited without altering the nature of a sport
or chilling vigorous participation.
IV. ONE POSSIBLE REMEDY
As discussed above, in the sports setting, the California courts need a
uniform approach to primary assumption of risk and a uniform definition of
recklessness. The courts' approach to primary assumption of risk should have the
policy behind the doctrine at the forefront. 346 The best solution would begin with a
uniform approach to the court's initial determination of whether plaintiff was
injured by a risk inherent in the sport. It also would eliminate the defendants' duty
not to increase the risk, and would adopt the Restatement standard for recklessness.
A. The Nature of the Sport: A Uniform Approach to Inherent Risk
As discussed earlier in this article, 34 California courts currently lack a
uniform approach when they decide whether plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent
in the sport. Because policy is the main object to be served by application of
primary assumption of risk in the sport setting, the best approach to inherent risk is
an approach which incorporates the policy behind the doctrine, such as the approach
used in Freeman,34 Campbell,3 4 9 and Lowe.3o Under the policy-based approach to
inherent risk, which finds its original support in Knight, a risk is not inherent if the
prohibition of the defendant's conduct would neither chill vigorous participation in
346 Courts have recognized that policy is central to the doctrine. Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31
Cal. 4th 990, 1011(2003); see also Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461,468 (2007) (noting that the
policy is the "overriding consideration" in the decision whether to apply primary assumption of risk);
Saville v. Sierra Coll., 133 Cal. App. 4th 857, 867 (2005); Ferrari v. Grand Canyon Dories, 32 Cal. App.
4th 248, 253 (1995).
3 See discussion supra Part III.B I.
' Freeman v. Hale, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1994).
3 Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823 (1999).
35o Lowe, 56 Cal. App. 4th 12.
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the sport or activity nor alter the nature of the sport or activity. 35 ' Stated another
way, a risk is inherent if the defendant's conduct involves an essential or integral
part of the sport and the sport cannot be played in the absence of such conduct.
35 2
This policy-based approach requires the court to examine not only the general type
of accident suffered by plaintiff, but also the specific conduct of the defendant.
The importance of a policy-based approach to inherent risk is obvious when
one examines the California Supreme Court's decision in Avila v. Citrus Community
College District."' In Avila, the court addressed a college district's liability after a
pitcher threw a baseball which struck the batter in the head, cracking his helmet. 354
The court ruled that such conduct was an inherent risk of baseball and primary
assumption of risk barred plaintiff's suit. 3 1 The court noted that such conduct was
used as an "integral part of pitching tactics"3 56 and, even though such conduct was
prohibited by the rules of baseball, "imposition of legal liability for such conduct
might well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from
vigorously engaging in activity that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a
prescribed rule."3 s When it determined whether plaintiff was injured by an
inherent risk of the sport, the court not only examined the general type of plaintiff's
injury, such as being hit by a pitch, but also examined the specific nature of the
defendant's conduct at issue. As a result, the court noted that every situation in
which a batter is hit by a pitch will not necessarily be deemed an inherent risk of the
sport of baseball:
The conclusion that being intentionally hit by a pitch is an inherent
risk of baseball extends only to situations such as that alleged here,
where the hit batter is at the plate. Allegations that a pitcher
intentionally hit a batter who was still in the on-deck circle, or
elsewhere, would present an entirely different scenario.
Thus, the policy considerations from Knight were central to the court's
determination that plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in the sport of baseball.
Applying Knight's policy to the pitcher's conduct revealed that the prohibition of
351 See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318-19 (1992); see also Freeman, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1394; see
also Campbell, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 829; see also Lowe, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 123.
352 Lowe, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 123.
353 Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 38 Cal. 4th 148 (2006).
354 Id. at 152, 163-65.
.s. Id. at 163-65.
356 Id. at 164.
317 Id. at 165 (quoting Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 318-19 (1992)).
.s. Id. at 165 n.l 1.
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such conduct would chill vigorous participation and alter the nature of the sport.
However, the opposite is true when Knight's policy is applied to the court's
example involving a pitcher who intentionally threw the baseball at a batter while
the batter was standing in the on-deck circle. Such conduct is not an integral part of
the game of baseball. Therefore, the batter, who was intentionally struck by a pitch
while he was standing in the on-deck circle, would not be injured by a risk inherent
in the sport of baseball.
The above examples illustrate that a policy-based test works well and
should be used as the test for inherent risk. In addition, the courts should focus not
only on the general type of accident when determining inherent risk, but also on the
defendant's conduct; the specific facts surrounding defendant's conduct often are
critical to the inherent risk inquiry. Cases such as Fortier and Staten which ignored
the specifics of defendant's conduct and merely concluded that collisions were
inherent in football and ice skating, respectively, might have reached contrary
conclusions if they had focused on the specific nature of the defendant's conduct
which led to the plaintiff s injury. 3 The court's determination of whether plaintiff
was injured by a risk inherent in the sport is fundamental to application of primary
assumption of risk. Similarly, the Knight policy should be the fundamental
component of the court's determination of inherent risk. Duty is based on inherent
risk. If application of a duty would violate the Knight policy, as it would in Avila,
then primary assumption of risk should be a total bar to plaintiffs lawsuit. If
prohibition of the defendant's conduct would not violate the Knight policy, then the
question becomes: Where does the inquiry go next? In other words, what standard
of care should apply to a defendant who is a coach or co-participant?
B. The Role of the Defendant: The Limited Duty of Care
for Coaches and Co-Participants
Much of the ambiguity surrounding primary assumption of risk and the
limited duty of coaches and co-participants will end if the defendant's duty to not
increase the risk is eliminated. After the court determines that application of a duty
would not violate the Knight policy, the court should apply the limited duty of care
from Knight and Kahn to coaches and co-participants in sport injury cases using the
Restatement definition for recklessness.
. See discussion supra Part 11I.B.1 .d.
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1. Eliminate the Separate Duty of Defendant Not to
Increase the Risk
The defendant's duty not to increase the risk should be eliminated for
several reasons: First, if the duty merely is another way of stating that whenever the
risk is increased then the plaintiff was not injured by an inherent risk, then the duty
is surplus and totally unnecessary. The court will, of necessity, implicitly address
and answer the question of whether the risk was increased when the court
determines whether plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent in the sport. This is
precisely why some courts have ruled the two questions are inseparable and
mutually exclusive,3o and why other courts have held the question of increased risk
is part of the initial duty determination for the court to decide as a question of
law.3 6 ' The question of what risks are inherent in a sport is necessarily intertwined
with the question of whether defendant increased the risk. One cannot address the
question of whether defendant increased the risks above those inherent in the sport
without first identifying the inherent risks. In addition, as courts have noted, if the
plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk, then defendant did not increase the risk,
and vice versa. 362
Second, if the duty not to increase the risk is merely a reference to
secondary assumption of risk, meant to note that any increase in the risk will lead to
liability using comparative fault, 3 then the language is unnecessary and confusing.
The language does not clearly articulate the type of duty that is owed by a particular
category of defendant in a sports injury case. For example, can this duty not to
increase the risk be used to impose liability on coaches and co-participants for
ordinary negligence? 3 6 Is it a way for plaintiffs to bypass the intentional/reckless
standard of Knight and Kahn? As discussed earlier, 365 courts are confused by the
language.
Third, if the duty not to increase the risk simply refers to the fact that any
360 See, e.g., Fortier v. Los Rios Cmty. Coll. Dist., 45 Cal. App. 4th430,440 (1996) (holding that a finding
plaintiffwas injured by a risk inherent in the sport necessarily precludes a finding that defendant increased
the inherent risk).
361 Huffv. Wilkins, 138 Cal. App. 4th 732, 745 (2006); see also Am. GolfCorp. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles Cty., 79 Cal. App. 4th 30, 37 (2000); see also Huffman v. City of Poway, 84 Cal. App. 4th 975,
995 n.23 (2000); see also Hemady v. Long Beach Sch. Dist., 143 Cal. App. 4th 566, 573-74 (2006).
362 See, e.g., Fortier, 45 Cal. App. 4th at 440 (holding that a finding plaintiff was injured by a risk inherent
in the sport necessarily precludes a finding that defendant increased the inherent risk).
3 See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 315-16 (1992).
3 See, e.g., Huff, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 739.
365 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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increased risk in cases where coaches or co-participants are defendants must rise to
the level of recklessness, 3 6 then such a duty is redundant. If the increased risk by a
coach or co-participant must rise to the level of recklessness, then why have a
separate duty not to increase the risk? Courts have already recognized that any
increase in the risk by a coach or co-participant must rise to the level of
recklessness.67 Thus, the duty not to increase the risk merely promotes muddled
judicial analysis.
The duty not to increase the risk should be eliminated. It is unnecessary.
The California Supreme Court already has articulated standards for various
categories of defendants, including coaches, instructors, co-participants, commercial
venue owners, and equipment suppliers. 3 6  In sport injury cases where primary
assumption of risk does not completely bar a plaintiff's suit, after a court has
determined the Knight policy would not be thwarted by recognizing a duty, the
court should merely consider the duty based on the role of the defendant and the
relationship of the parties.369 In other words, for coaches and co-participants, their
duty simply should be to refrain from intentionally injuring plaintiff or engaging in
conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in
the sport. 370
2. Apply the Restatement Approach to Recklessness
Finally, the California courts should apply a workable, uniform standard for
recklessness in sport injury cases. The California courts' definition of recklessness
as conduct "totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport" has
led to great confusion and is not useful as a standard. It provides courts with no
guidance. How are courts to determine whether conduct is "totally" outside the
3 See Kahn v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. 4th 990, 995-96 (2003).
367 Id.; see also Bjork v. Mason, 77 Cal. App. 4th 544, 553-54 (2000) (noting that co-participants are liable
for recklessness and recognizing that any increase in the risk must rise to the level of recklessness); see
also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577, 597 n. 10 (2004) (explaining that any increase in
the risk by a coach or co-participant must rise to the level of recklessness).
3 See, e.g., Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 996 (standard for coaches); see also Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 320 (standard
for co-participants); see also Vine v. Bear Valley Ski Co., 118 Cal. App. 4th 577, 598-99(2004) (standard
for venue owners); Zipusch v. LA Workout, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1281, 1292 (2007) (standard for
equipment providers).
369 As the Knight court noted: "[T]he nature of the applicable duty or standard of care frequently varies
with the role ofthe defendant whose conduct is at issue in a given case." Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 318.
370 Id. at 320; see also Kahn, 31 Cal. 4th at 996. If the California Supreme Court envisions a scenario
where it is appropriate to hold co-participants or instructors to a negligence standard, then it should clearly
articulate the circumstances when the use of such a standard would be appropriate in sport injury cases.
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range of ordinary activity, as opposed to "just" outside or "barely" outside?
Furthermore, because ordinary careless conduct frequently is treated as an inherent
risk of a sport and is not actionable even if it is a sport rule violation, the ability to
label conduct as being "totally' outside the range of ordinary activity becomes even
more difficult. For example, is the failure to use a retention strap on a snowboard
"totally" outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport of
snowboarding or is it merely careless, even if it is a rule violation? When does
conduct pass from negligent to reckless using the court's standard? In other words,
when does conduct move from "outside the range of ordinary activity" to "totally
outside the range of ordinary activity"?
In Knight and its progeny, the California Supreme Court could have used
the Restatement to define recklessness, but the court chose not to do so.
Presumably, the court did not want to link recklessness with a standard that uses an
unreasonable or high risk of serious harm, because most sports involve such risks.
As a result, the court most likely believed that linking recklessness to a high risk of
serious harm could be problematic in sport injury cases where the inherent risks of a
sport must be considered. For example, cases involving sports such as boxing or
martial arts involve conduct that would arguably be reckless under the Restatement
standard due to the high risk of serious harm integral to those sports.371
Nevertheless, use of the Restatement to define recklessness in sport injury cases is a
viable alternative to the Knight standard. Use of the Restatement standard also will
add much needed clarity to California sport injury jurisprudence.
Although most sports involve an increased risk of serious harm, the
Restatement approach can be used as a recklessness standard without difficulty if
the question of recklessness is raised, as it should be, after the court has applied the
policy-based test for inherent risk as suggested above. In other words, the
Restatement approach for recklessness would be used after the court has determined
that the Knight policy supports application of a limited duty of care in the particular
case. An illustration of why the Restatement approach should be used only after the
court has applied the Knight policy test for inherent risk can be best illustrated by
revisiting the California Supreme Court's decision in Avila v. Citrus Community
College District, discussed earlier. 3
7 2
In Avila, the California Supreme Court noted that the practice in baseball of
a pitcher throwing a baseball at or near the batter's head would not lead to liability
371 See, e.g., Rodrigo v. Koryo Martial Arts, 100 Cal. App. 4th 952, 954-56 (2002); see also Bushnell v.
Japanese-Am. Religious & Cultural Ctr.,43 Cal. App. 4th 525, 532 (1996); see also Saville v. Sierra Coll.,
133 Cal. App. 4th 857, 871 (2005).
372 See supra notes 353-59 and accompanying text.
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even though such "beanballs" can result in serious injury or death. 3 As noted
earlier, because Knight defined recklessness as conduct "totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport," the practice ofthrowing a "beanball" could
not be reckless as a matter of law under Knight's definition of recklessness. 374
However, if a court used the Restatement's definition to determine whetherpitching
a beanball was reckless, such conduct would arguably meet the definition of
recklessness because it is done in disregard of the high risk of serious harm. If,
however, a court first applied the inherent risk policy test suggested above, the
question of recklessness would never be reached. The court would conclude that,
because throwing a beanball is strategic and an integral part of the game, and
because such conduct could not be eliminated without altering the nature of the
game, defendant has no duty to protect plaintiff from such conduct. Plaintiffs suit
would be barred. Thus, even though the Restatement approach fails to account for
inherent risks in sports, that failure is inconsequential ifpolicy and inherent risk are
addressed by a court prior to reaching the question of defendant's recklessness. 3 75
An example of how the Restatement approach would be extremely helpful
to a court can be seen by reexamining Campbell v. Derylo, using the Restatement
standard for recklessness. In Campbell, plaintiff was struck by defendant's runaway
snowboard; a retention strap would have tethered the snowboard to the plaintiffs
leg or boot.3 77 The court noted that negligence was not a proper basis for liability in
a suit against a co-participant. The Campbell Court held that a jury should
determine whether the defendant's failure to use a retention strap on his snowboard
increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff.3 7 9 Although Campbell did not use the
3 Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 38 Cal. 4th 148, 163-64 (2006).
374 See id. at 165 (noting that such conduct cannot be reckless). In fact, because the practice is an integral
part ofthc game ofbaseball and cannot be eliminated without altering the game, the court noted that even
if the pitcher intentionally threw the ball at the batter's head, primary assumption of risk would bar
plaintiff's recovery:
In Knight, [citation omitted] we acknowledged that an athlete does not assume the
risk ofa co-participant's intentional or reckless conduct "totally outside the range of
the ordinary activity involved in the sport." Here, even if the Citrus College pitcher
intentionally threw at Avila, his conduct did not fall outside the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport.
Id.
37s But see Towns v. Davidson, 147 Cal. App. 4th 461,470 (2007) (applying Knight's policy to determine
whether defendant's conduct was reckless).
1 Campbell v. Derylo, 75 Cal. App. 4th 823 (1999).
3n Id. at 825.
37 See id. at 829 n.2.
. Id. at 830.
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Restatement approach or conclude the defendant was reckless, the approach
arguably would have enabled the court to determine whether the defendant's
conduct was reckless as a matter of law and could have avoided sending the
question of recklessness to the trier of fact. Under the Knight standard for
recklessness, it is not surprising that the court did not rule whether the defendant
was reckless as a matter of law. Was the defendant's failure to use a retention strap
on his snowboard "so reckless" as to be "totally" beyond the range of ordinary
activity involved in the sport? How would a court, or a trier of fact, answer this
question? When does conduct move from "beyond" to "totally beyond"? What
activity is "ordinary"? Would it depend on whether snowboarders "ordinarily" use
retention straps? How many snowboarders would have to use retention straps
before the conduct would be considered "ordinary activity"? Would it matter if the
resort and county both required snowboarders to use retention straps3 soor, would the
snowboarder's violation of the rule requiring retention straps carry little, if any,
weight under a standard that asks whether conduct is "totally" outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport? Could the defendant's failure to use a
retention strap be viewed as careless conduct rather than conduct so reckless as to
be totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport of
snowboarding? Possibly, the court sent the case to the jury because deciding
recklessness as a matter of law under the Knight standard is a Herculean task.
Use of the Restatement approach for recklessness would have made the
Campbell Court's task much easier. Rather than focusing on whether the failure to
use a retention strap was "totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in
the sport," the court instead could have focused its inquiry on the high degree of risk
of physical harm and the actor's conscious disregard or indifference to that risk.3 81
This standard, although not a perfect model of clarity, at least provides the court
with direction and focus. The Restatement approach also shifts the recklessness
inquiry away from examining whether conduct is totally outside the range of
ordinary activity involved in the sport and instead focuses on the conduct's high
degree of risk of physical harm and defendant's conscious disregard or indifference.
There is no need to reexamine whether the defendant's conduct was outside the
range of ordinary activity involved in the sport. The question of whether the
defendant's conduct was outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport
would have been addressed by the court earlier, when the court answered the
3o See id. at 825 (noting that both El Dorado County ordinance and the skier responsibility code at
Heavenly Valley Resort required defendant to use a retention strap on his snowboard).
381 See Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188,1200 (2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
500 (1965)).
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question of whether the plaintiff was injured by an inherent risk. Requiring the
court to revisit the inherent risk inquiry for recklessness, and merely adding the
adjective "totally" to that inquiry to define recklessness, is confusing and
unnecessary. Furthermore, untangling the recklessness inquiry from the inherent
risk/duty inquiry, which is a question of law for the court, is a positive and much
needed step toward ending the confusion. Using the Restatement approach as
described above, the question of recklessness will only be raised after the court
already has determined the defendant's conduct was not an integral or essential part
of the game, and after the court has determined the conduct could be eliminated
without chilling vigorous participation or altering the nature of the sport or activity.
V. CONCLUSION
California primary assumption of risk jurisprudence lacks a uniform, clear,
and manageable approach to recklessness. The confusion can be significantly
decreased, and perhaps eliminated, if the courts adopt a uniform, policy-based
approach to inherent risk. Under the policy-based approach to inherent risk, which
finds its original support in Knight, a risk is inherent if the prohibition of the
defendant's conduct would neither chill vigorous participation in the sport or
activity nor alter the nature of the sport or activity. Stated another way, a risk is
inherent if defendant's conduct involves an "essential or integral part" of the sport
and the sport cannot be played in the absence of such conduct. This policy-based
approach requires the court to examine not only the general type of accident
suffered by plaintiff, but also the specific conduct of the defendant. California
courts also should use the Restatement standard for recklessness in sport injury
cases. The Restatement approach can be used as a recklessness standard without
difficulty if the question of recklessness is raised, as it should be, after the court has
applied the policy-based test for inherent risk as suggested above. In other words,
the Restatement approach for recklessness would be used after the court has
determined that the Knight policy supports application of a limited duty of care in
the particular case. Finally, the courts should abandon the defendant's duty not to
increase the risk above those inherent in a sport. The duty not to increase the risk is
unnecessary and only increases confusion.
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